

The Strategic Dilemma of Pakistan:

Balancing relations between US and China

Prepared By: Burhan Umer

Supervisor: Dr Marosán Bence Péter

2024

Contents

List of Tables and Figures	3
Abstract	3
1. Introduction	4
1.1 Background:.....	4
1.2 Problem Statement:.....	5
1.3 Significance of the study.....	6
1.4 Research Scope and Objectives	6
1.5 Research Hypothesis.....	7
1.5 Research Questions.....	7
2. Literature Review.....	8
2.1 Historical Background of Pakistan.....	8
2.2 Alliances in International Relations.....	9
2.3 Pakistan China Alliance over the years	13
2.3.1 Historical Formation of Diplomacy	15
2.3.2 Bandung Diplomacy and Pakistan-China-India Border Disputes.....	18
2.3.3 Sino Indian War (1962)	20
2.3.4 Treaty of Friendship (1963) and Strategic Alignment.....	21
2.3.5 Pak-India war 1965 and China's support.....	24
2.3.6 Cold war Era (1971-90).....	24
2.3.7 Post Cold War Era and 21 st Century Prospects	26
2.4 History of Pakistan US Relations.....	28
2.4.1 The Honeymoon Era (1950s)	30
2.4.2 Change of Dynamics (1960s-1979).....	31
2.4.3 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979.....	34
2.4.4 Decline of Relations in the 90s.	36
2.4.5 Revival of relations post 9/11	38
History of US China Relations (1950-Present).....	39
3. Theoretical Framework	44
3.1 Hedging Theory in International Relations	44

4. Pakistan’s Hedging Approach towards US China so far	47
5. Pakistan’s tilt towards China and Decline of US Pak Alliance in the Recent Years	51
5.1 US Unfulfilled Expectations on War on Terrorism	51
5.2 US India Alliance.....	54
5.3 BRI and CPEC	56
6. Pakistan’s current Foreign Policy and Strategic Dilemma	59
7. Conclusion.....	64
8. Future Recommendations	66
Bibliography	68
Appendix	73
Declaration of Originality.....	73

List of Tables and Figures

Table

1.....	
.....	63

Abstract

Pakistan is in a difficult geopolitical situation because of the strategic rivalry between the US and China, which calls for a cautious balancing between the two adversary nations. This paper examines Pakistan's continuous hedging conundrum, in which the nation must manage its military, political, and economic ties with both superpowers in the face of growing international rivalry. Through strategic alliances formed during the Cold War and the Soviet Afghan conflict, Pakistan has historically been able to maintain strong ties with both China and the United States. However, Pakistan's options for hedging have become more limited in the current geopolitical

climate, which is characterized by programs like China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan's foreign policy decisions have become even more complex because of the US pulling out of Afghanistan and shifting its focus to compete with China. This paper emphasizes the geopolitical, economic, and strategic ramifications for South Asia by examining these processes and showing how Pakistan's existing strategy for preserving a strategic balance is becoming more difficult. The results provide information about how Pakistan's foreign policy is changing in response to the strains of resurgent great power competition as well as possible directions for its diplomatic approach going forward.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background:

Pakistan, a South Asian nation with a strategic position, has faced a difficult geopolitical landscape since attaining independence in 1947. Its foreign policy has been significantly influenced by its geostrategic location, internal political environment, and regional security concerns. Pakistan has traditionally maintained a careful balance in its ties with larger nations, particularly the United States and China.

The US-Pakistan relationship has had both cooperative and contentious periods. During the Cold War, Pakistan allied with the United States as a vital regional ally, receiving substantial military and financial assistance. The primary driving force behind this collaboration was a shared desire to curtail the Soviet Union's hegemony in South Asia. However, problems in the cooperation were brought on by Pakistan's nuclear program and its support for Islamist terrorist groups.

Accusations and mistrust between the two countries have caused the US-Pakistan relationship to worsen in recent years. Pakistan has accused the US of using double standards in the battle against terrorism and criticized the US for its drone operations, while the US has voiced concerns about Pakistan's support for terrorist organizations and counterterrorism initiatives.

In contrast, Pakistan's relations with China have improved dramatically in recent decades. The strategic partnership between the two countries has been built on mutual trust and shared goals. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive infrastructural project, has improved bilateral ties and given Pakistan significant economic opportunities.

But Pakistan's increasing dependence on China has sparked questions about its strategic independence and capacity to keep a healthy relationship with the United States. The US has expressed concerns about CPEC's potential to increase China's regional dominance and its implications for regional security.

Pakistan has a strategic dilemma as it attempts to manage its relations with the US and China. Even as it seeks to benefit from China's economic and geopolitical support, it recognizes the need of maintaining a friendly relationship with the US, a major global force. Pakistan's ability to navigate this difficult geopolitical landscape will have a significant impact on its future trajectory.

1.2 Problem Statement:

How can Pakistan effectively balance its strategic interests with the United States and China, particularly in the context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), without compromising its national sovereignty and economic stability?

1.3 Significance of the study

This study is important because it can shed light on the intricate geopolitical environment in which Pakistan functions. This study will help us better comprehend Pakistan's prospects and problems by looking at the complex balance between its relations with China and the United States. The results will provide policymakers with useful information about possible approaches to striking this fine balance. Additionally, this research will contribute to the body of knowledge on international relations, specifically about developing powers and great power competition. Scholars, decision-makers, and the public will all benefit from this research's analysis of how Pakistan's strategic decisions affect regional security and economic growth.

1.4 Research Scope and Objectives

This study's focus is on examining Pakistan's strategic foreign policy, specifically its efforts to maintain a balance between China and the United States in the face of their growing competition. The study attempts to give a thorough grasp of how Pakistan has handled this difficult situation by looking at the historical, economic, and geopolitical elements that have influenced Pakistan's bilateral ties with these countries. This paper explores Pakistan's hedging strategy, which aims for neutrality and mutual benefit, while pointing out the increasing challenges, especially because of China's growing influence through programs like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Additionally, this study will evaluate how these ties affect Pakistan's regional stature in South Asia as well as its national interests. To preserve diplomatic equilibrium, protect national security, and promote economic development, the goal is to examine Pakistan's opportunities, threats, and possible future directions. By doing this, our study adds to the larger

conversation on how great power competition affects smaller nations aiming for strategic independence.

1.5 Research Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: Pakistan's ties with China and the United States have been greatly influenced by historical causes, including geopolitical concerns and common strategic objectives, which have resulted in a difficult and ever-changing diplomatic balancing act.

Hypothesis 2: Pakistan has faced both possibilities and problems as a result of the growing geopolitical competition between the US and China. Pakistan may negotiate advantageous agreements with both nations thanks to the rivalry, but it also raises the possibility of becoming caught in the crossfire of their geopolitical conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Pakistan faces a difficult task in maintaining a balanced position between the US and China. Pakistan must successfully handle internal political restrictions, adjust to shifting geopolitical forces, and carefully balance the advantages and disadvantages of its foreign policy decisions in order to do this.

1.5 Research Questions

- What are the historical drivers of Pakistan's relationships with China and the United States?
- How has the US-China rivalry affected Pakistan's diplomatic positioning?
- What are the challenges and opportunities for Pakistan in maintaining a balanced stance?

2. Literature Review

2.1 Historical Background of Pakistan

In the aftermath of the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Indian Muslim community pushed for the establishment of an independent nation, which ultimately resulted in the formation of Pakistan. Constitution of Pakistan, which was ratified in 1973, is the most important legal framework in Pakistan. It stipulates that no law shall be established that is in opposition with the teachings of Islam as found in the Quran and the Sunnah. The fact that the nation was founded in the name of Islam is one of the primary reasons why it is generally seen as exceptional. Its political and economic significance has been recognized not only by the United States of America but also by other major countries that are located in close proximity to it. It has a population of 188 million people, the sixth largest army in the world, a nuclear weapons stockpile, and a strategic location. Iran is located to the southwest of the country, Afghanistan is located to the west, China is located to the east, and China borders the nation to the extreme northeast. After the country gained its independence, Pakistan's history has been marked by significant ethnic tensions and conflicts. On the one hand, these are the result of the nation-state borders and the identity of Muslims, both of which function as dividing lines between different social groupings. On the other hand, its powerful military state government is also too responsible for many violations of human rights, a lack of accountability, and widespread, widespread corruption. In addition, the nation is susceptible to a rising insurgency that is led by radical Islamist and extremist groups. This vulnerability is a result of the political upheaval and internal conflicts that are occurring, which also serve as a haven for these terrorist groups. In

addition, the nation continues to struggle with a few serious issues, including as poverty, famine, illiteracy, and gender inequality (EFSAS, 2017)

2.2 Alliances in International Relations

One of the most important components of successful statecraft in international affairs is undoubtedly alliances. The perceived balance between the alliance's benefits and liabilities for each member serves as the foundation for these alliances' design. Accordingly, forming an alliance is arguably one of the primary subjects of foreign policy discussion, with a particular emphasis on the questions of "to whom" and "how long". Usually, an alliance would be formed by two or more nations with the intention of opposing a shared foe. While larger governments would join an alliance for self-interest and to keep their enemies from accessing their resources, weaker states would frequently do so to protect themselves from a strong and possible adversary and achieve the desired stability and prestige (Muhammad Hatim, 2023).

Additionally, states are encouraged to join forces with the ultimate objective of gaining increased security. It is anticipated that states will look to their own allies for military and diplomatic support during a conflict. Therefore, an alliance's effectiveness is based on its capacity to neutralize a shared threat. Because of this, an alliance dissolves when its members no longer share a common threat and when benefits and expenses are distributed unevenly (Muhammad Hatim, 2023).

The political and military climate of the European continent may be frequently linked to the history of international alliances. The major justification for forming an alliance is based on preserving the balance of power between the parties (Haglund, 2009). Alliances have their roots in the earliest periods of human civilization. The establishment of a durable coalition during the

Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece is a well-known illustration of such partnerships. Two alliances were shown in this war: the Peloponnesian League, which was formed by Spartans and their friends, and the Delian League, which was formed by Athenians and their allies on the other side (Lendering, 2017).

(Haglund, 2009) also discloses Kautilya's classic work, *Artha-Sastra* (c. 300 BC), in which he discusses the establishment of alliances. He emphasized that states ought to establish alliances with other people in order to enlist their help and support in the fight against their shared foe.

The European continent was home to numerous medium-sized nations during the Middle Ages. The Dutch Republic, the Archduchy of Austria, England, France, Spain, Savoy, and the Holy Roman Empire are some of the most well-known instances of these nations. Every time a nation from this continent attempted to assert hegemony, other nations responded by forging coalitions to prevent it, such as the League of Augsburg, commonly known as the Grand Alliance, in 1689 (Jr, 2004).

Not a single state has had the military might to create enduring hegemony over the other nation states in Europe since the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1468, bringing the idea of nation states to life. In response to any attempt by one nation to assume hegemony, other nations would band together to oppose it. For example, King Louis of France made several attempts but was unable to establish a long-lasting dominion over Europe. This failure resulted from other nation states forming alliances against French aspirations, which ultimately sparked the Grand Alliance War. In a similar vein, Napoleon Bonaparte's desire to rule over Europe continent was stopped by a number of coalitions (Haglund, 2009).

Although, as previously said, the history of interstate alliances is typically associated with the Westphalian states system and the European balance of power, such coalitions have also formed on other continents. In the South American developing states, alliances had a significant impact on the regional balance. During the 1865–1870 Paraguayan War, for example, the triple alliance of Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina decisively crushed the country, lowering its population and territory (Marley, 1998).

The development of the alliance between the Ottoman Sultan and the Roman Catholic King of France in 1536 to oppose the Roman Emperor did not rely on ideology, which was another important element that served as the foundation for many alliances. Similarly, in order to combat Nazi Germany during World War II, the democratically elected governments of the United States and Great Britain formed an alliance with the communist Soviet Union (USSR) (Muhammad Hatim, 2023).

When France and Germany began their economic and military rivalry at the end of the 19th century, which ultimately caused division on the European continent, alliances reached a new level. Two coalitions were created as a result of the rivalry: "the Central Powers" (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and "the Allies" (France, Great Britain, and Russia) (Muhammad Hatim, 2023). These coalitions caused unrest in the area, which ultimately sparked the First World War in 1914 when Austria-Hungary and Russia clashed, setting both alliances against one another on European battlefields (Haglund, 2009).

China, Great Britain, and France created the defensive alliance as a result of Germany, Japan, and Italy forming the offensive alliance known as the Axis in their struggle for global supremacy during World War II (1939–1945). Later, in 1941, the US and USSR joined the defensive alliance side.

Following their victory over the Axis in 1945, the victorious Allies founded the United Nations (UN) to promote global cooperation and collective security (Churchill, 1959).

Two crucial military alliances during the Cold War era were established in the wake of World War II on the basis of opposing ideologies. In 1949, western European nations, Canada, and Great Britain joined the United States to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In response to the threat posed by NATO's establishment, the USSR and its satellites in Eastern and Central Europe established the Warsaw Pact in 1955 as a military alliance.

The Cold War competition between the member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO was sparked by their formation (Wagner, 1978). Following the establishment of these alliances, the United States created a number of treaty organizations, including the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the USSR in 1991 marked the end of these treaty organizations (Haglund, 2009).

The necessity of an opponent to maintain alliance unity was a topic of intense discussion among many academics in the immediate post-Cold War era, when there was no obvious European block. For example, there was discussion about whether NATO should be abolished or kept in place following the fall of the USSR (Kireyev, 2004). Conversely, some high-profile crises have highlighted this conventional motivating element for creating an alliance. To combat international terrorism, for example, the U.S. government formed a broad coalition with both new partners, like Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, and old allies, like the United Kingdom, France, and Pakistan, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre (Haglund, 2009). These circumstances created a fresh basis for forging coalitions to combat a shared threat.

2.3 Pakistan China Alliance over the years

Known as "all-weather" and "iron brothers," Pakistan and China have a unique and enduring connection that reflects their strong friendship and steadfast dedication to strategic cooperation over many years. Their political and economic relationship's historical trajectory demonstrates the trust that has developed over time. Their multifaceted cooperation has been firmly established by this trust, which is founded on respect and common interests. It demonstrates how diplomacy can develop into a long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship that goes beyond simple alliances (Ilmas, 2023).

An extensive history of dynasties may be found in China's ancient civilization. Strong Chinese views of China as a "Middle kingdom" and foreigners as "barbarians" have been at the centre of China's security strategy. According to its "cosmopolitanism policy," China has been heavily impacted by its historical and traditional pattern of interactions with foreigners; these effects are still evident in China's foreign policy. China first made touch with the outside world during the Han era when it connected with Jib in Kashmir, which is a subcontinent in South Asia, via the Silk Road. Furthermore, in the early seventh century BC, Chinese explorers Fa Hsien and Heun Tsang came to this area (Jahangir, 2015).

Religious relations, especially those of Islam, have become firmly ingrained in Xinjiang province because of these historical exchanges. Buddhism, however, expanded widely throughout China. The geographical gaps between the two ancient, affluent civilizations were gradually reduced by these theological affinities, creating religious, cultural, and economic relationships. During their lengthy journeys from Kapica, Buddhist pilgrims would travel to northern India, which is now part of Pakistan, including Gilgit and other regions (Butt, 2007).

China and Pakistan have unmatched and unequalled relations. Because of their enduring friendship and strong fraternity, it is the most renowned and admirable union of the age. Due to free trade agreements and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), cooperative connections have gained international attention in the twenty-first century. In the twenty-first century, Asia has become the center of attention instead of Europe and the Middle East. Asia's economic and geostrategic significance has drawn attention to and increased its significance. In particular, the publishing of China's financial project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in Pakistan has drawn the attention of many countries and important national and international entities. The Pak-China-Russia triad coalition and the Indo-US strategic partnership are hot spots for geopolitical diversion in South Asia (Anwar, 2020).

Islamabad was one of the first nations to recognize the PRC in the 1950s, which is when the connection officially began. The mutual hostility towards India served as the foundation for the strong and encouraging relations that currently exist between Beijing and Islamabad. In order to offset India's possible dominance on the vital South Asian subcontinent, both nations applied the idea of balance of power. Because it provided reciprocal protection in the case of a conflict with India, the Sino-Pak cooperation was beneficial to both parties. Pakistan has gained access to military hardware and cutting-edge combat technologies through China, and the recurrent conflicts between India and Pakistan take New Delhi's focus away from growing its capabilities and dominance over the region—something Beijing is choosing to avoid. When its "all-weather" friend ran into Islamic extremists, Pakistan provided a battlefield. The two nations have developed cooperative economic initiatives, swapped nuclear weapons and intelligence, proposed military and civilian accords, and worked together to combat their shared adversaries. China has emerged for Pakistan as a substitute for all that the United States has been unable to

provide or fulfil. Given India's ascent in the global interstate hierarchy, it is anticipated that the "friendly" Sino-Pak relationship may eventually attain even greater mutual value (EFSAS, 2017).

The fundamental components of the relationship between China and Pakistan include mutual respect, faith, and geopolitical compatibility. Since 1955, China and Pakistan's relations have grown closer on all fronts—political, strategic, and diplomatic. Pakistan acknowledged the People's Republic of China as the first Islamic state. The establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nations began in 1951. Then, under the leadership of the US military, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. subsequently joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Joining these forces was done only to fortify Pakistan against Indian threats. America was supporting India in SEATO and CENTO when Pakistan sided with China during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Additionally, Pakistan supported China for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1961. A new era of loyal and trustworthy friendship between Pakistan and China began with the well-known adage, "Enemy of an enemy is a friend." Even in the 1965 war, China not only helped Pakistan between India and Pakistan, but it also warned India to end the conflict (Anwar, 2020).

2.3.1 Historical Formation of Diplomacy

When Pakistan formally recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1950s, it was a significant act that laid the groundwork for the diplomatic relationship between the two countries. This diplomatic gesture has great significance because it was done at a critical juncture in world politics. A strategic reaction to the quickly changing global political environment, which was heavily impacted by Cold War dynamics, was at the core of this insight (Ilmas, 2023).

The world was seeing a complicated and sophisticated geopolitical chessboard in the early 1950s as tensions between the US and the USSR increased during the Cold War (Seth Schindler, 2021). Pakistan's choice to recognize the PRC represented a significant shift in its foreign policy in this regard. Notably, this change was a departure from Pakistan's previous position, which had supported Taiwan's legitimacy as China's government. The change in Pakistan's foreign policy brought to light the country's clever diplomatic strategies, which were primarily influenced by the profound changes that were typical of the Cold War era (Jahangir, 2015).

Relations between the two nations were difficult and chilly in the beginning. For the first few years, Pakistan-China ambassadorial relations were tense simply because China chose to align itself with the USSR, a socialist state, while Pakistan chose to align itself with the US in global policymaking. Up until now, the foreign policy has been a rare occurrence in both Chinese and Pakistani education. China was viewed as a threat to Pakistan in the early stages because of its communist ideology. At that time, the border between the two nations was not well defined, and China seized several areas of Gilgit and Hunza, claiming them as their own territory (Anwar, 2020).

However, because Pakistan's leadership was preoccupied with internal matters, the historical commercial and cultural ties persisted. Pakistan was not entirely prepared to acknowledge China's government when the Communists seized control of the Chinese mainland and installed a government in Peking. Pakistan was still unsure about whether it should have acknowledged a communist state after receiving the Soviet Union's first formal invitation to visit. Both the East and the West posed a threat to Pakistan's security because of the Indian invasion of Kashmir and Afghanistan's claim to Pakhunistan, which threatened Pakistan's territorial integrity. Pakistan could thus not afford to acquire any more adversaries than it already had (Bhola, 1986).

Second, both the Chinese and Pakistani sides politicized doctrinal differences. Thirdly, both nations were essentially unaware of one another. However, the only individual who was acquainted with China in some way and assisted in introducing it to Pakistani political elites was Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan. Fourth, Pakistan could hardly avoid being a victim of Cold War politics and "power-bloc rivalries" in the bipolar international system pitting Communists against Capitalists. Pakistan adopted a non-alignment foreign policy because Liaquat Ali Khan, the country's first prime minister, had already accepted the invitation of the US, which represented a capitalist bloc, rather than the USSR, which represented a communist bloc (Bhola, 1986).

Finally, the Communist government of China was not recognized by the United States. However, Pakistan had to recognize China due to the circumstances. Even though Pakistan was importing coal from India rather than exporting cotton and jute, trade between the two countries was stopped in September 1949 because to India's immoral decision to devalue its currency all at once. India and Pakistan's bilateral trade was halted by the currency devaluation. However, the lack of coal and transportation to support the little sector was a blow to Pakistan's economy. The Chinese then supported Pakistan's faltering economy by offering a "coal for cotton barter deal" in 1949–1950 (Chaudhri, 1970). As a result, Pakistan became the third Muslim nation to recognize China's independence, following Burma and India.

One of Pakistan's multifaceted goals for Chinese recognition was to allow China to back Pakistan's position on Kashmir in the UN Security Council once it had the seat and veto power. However, China's attempts to join the UN were thwarted in the early 1950s by the US containment strategy against the Communist bloc; Pakistan's foreign policy was also affected, and China's campaign for territorial integrity in Tibet and Formosa (now Taiwan) created a

conflict of interest between the US and China. As a Commonwealth member, Pakistan's socio-political and economic stability was reliant on the West, particularly Britain, its most powerful friend in the US. However, Pakistan gained the USSR's enmity while fostering friendships with China and the US through a successful bilateralism program. Pakistan chose to maintain its neutrality on China's domestic issues, such as Tibet, during these crucial times. Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan publicly backed China on the issue of China's permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Jahangir, 2015).

2.3.2 Bandung Diplomacy and Pakistan-China-India Border Disputes

As mentioned above, initially the relations between Pakistan and China remained cold for the first few years specially when Pakistan signed the CENTO and SEATO in 1954. To determine how to consolidate its safety and building economy on reverberation equilibria, Pakistan and the United States entered into a two-sided agreement (Anwar, 2020).

In the lead-up to 1954, Pakistan had to minimize the perceived security dangers to the nascent communist state while both the USSR and the US bolstered India's expanding military strength. To counter China's military capabilities, Pakistan aligned itself with the capitalist bloc to enhance its own military technologies. Meanwhile, the US aimed to establish a collective military alliance to curb the spread of Communism in Asia. After Pakistan's military officials visited the United States and Secretary of Defense Iskandar Mirza made a trip, Pakistan formally joined the Western camp. General Ayub Khan, the head of the Pakistani army, traveled to both the US and Turkey, which was then a significant ally of the US. Following these visits, Pakistan made two critical military agreements with the United States: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), also referred to as the Baghdad Pact, in February 1955, and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 (Rizwan Naseer, 2011).

Except for occasional military and financial support from 1953 to 1961, Pakistan was unable to gain any significant advantages from this mutual defense aid, even though it gave the US permission to build a military facility in Peshawar. On the other hand, after Pakistan rejected the Soviets' invitation to visit Moscow, ties between the USSR and Pakistan deteriorated. Thus, the Soviets began an anti-Pakistan campaign, supporting the Pakhtoonistan problem, endorsing India's position on Kashmir in the UNSC, and causing the unrest in Northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) through Afghanistan. China, meanwhile, said that the US was involved in "subversive" and "interventionist" actions. Peking immediately and clearly denounced Pakistan's partnership with the United States over CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan's treaties with the US and Turkey, according to a People's Daily correspondent, will jeopardize peace and destabilize Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Notably, these agreements would endanger Pakistan's security and sovereignty and transform it into an American "war base" (Jahangir, 2015).

Pakistan's Western-leaning foreign policy remained unchanged despite the change of rulers, while the country's politics were gradually adopting communist reforms. Through Bandung Diplomacy, Pakistan's then-prime minister Muhammad Ali Bogra helped to quell the country's anti-Western feelings. Chou Enlai was reassured by the Pakistani envoy at the Manila Conference that the Sino-Pakistan friendship will continue to thrive despite the tight ties between the US and Pakistan. The similar belief that "China and Pakistan could peacefully coexist" going forward was also expressed by Chou Enlai (Goswami, 1971). Chou Enlai invited Pakistan to join the Bandung Conference, and Pakistan accepted.

Chou Enlai and Nehru led the non-aligned Afro-Asian state leaders to a single platform at the Bandung Conference in 1955. As the top leadership of both nations committed to upholding the

spirit of the Panchsheel accord (1954) on the Tibet problem, China-India relations were at their peak during the Bandung Conference. The five well-known principles of "peaceful coexistence" were included in this agreement. Subsequently, Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra was able to persuade Chou Enlai that Pakistan was not afraid of a Chinese invasion. Enlai spoke on Bogra's behalf at the conference, stating that Pakistan had signed SEATO with America solely to satisfy its security obligations about India. He gave his word that Pakistan would neither join an anti-Chinese alliance or take part in any conflict between the US and China. Confidence between China and Pakistan increased with the conclusion of the Bandung Conference. Meanwhile, the Chinese premier also supported Pakistan's ten-point program, known as the "Seven Pillars of Peace" which the Indian former premier Nehru opposed (Jahangir, 2015).

The success of the Bandung Conference set the stage for fostering positive interpersonal, business, cultural, and diplomatic relationships. Chou Enlai and Suhrawardy also emphasized that there were no distinctions between the two nations. Furthermore, China's stance on the Kashmir issue remains unchanged: India and Pakistan should settle their disputes through peaceful means. Conversely, India's endeavor to assume leadership among the Afro-Asian countries during the Bandung Conference highlighted the growing "conflict of interest" between China and India. More importantly, Pakistan had the opportunity to enhance its reputation among China and other Afro-Asian nations. Likewise, as tensions increased between China and India over territorial disputes, China recognized the strategic significance of Pakistan in connecting China to the Middle East and other areas via the Indian Ocean (Jahangir, 2015).

2.3.3 Sino Indian War (1962)

An important turning point in the history of Pakistan-China relations, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 had a lasting impression on their diplomatic relations. Pakistan strategically sided with

China throughout this pivotal crisis, paving a way that went well beyond political rhetoric. A major factor in strengthening their strategic alliance was Pakistan's steadfast diplomatic and political support for China during this crisis (Ilmas, 2023).

India accused China of starting a war in areas of Ladakh (Kashmir) and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) during the pivotal point of 1962. Pakistan's request for military assistance was denied at that time, but India received full military support during the Run of Kutch conflict in 1962, making the USSR and US's inclination towards India more apparent. In this way, Pakistan completely denounced India for waging a phony war in order to obtain weaponry from the US and the West following China's unilateral ceasefire. Conversely, China's aggressive and expansionist goals and policies were condemned by the US. Similar to this, several other US attempts to incite conflict between China and Pakistan also failed; for example, at that time, the US dispatched delegates to pressure India into starting discussions with Pakistan on the Kashmir problem, but the talks finally fell through. China chose not to address the boundary dispute with India after India's devastating defeat. This disagreement actually concerned the region west of the Karakoram Pass, which divided Indian-controlled Ladakh from Baltistan. According to a different perspective, China initially offered India a solution to the boundary conflict. Following India's lack of response, China proceeded to settle the territorial disputes with Pakistan. Previously, China had not committed to demarcating its borders with Pakistan, but when India's response was unfavorable, it proceeded with the demarcation process with Pakistan whenever relations between China and India soured (Jahangir, 2015).

2.3.4 Treaty of Friendship (1963) and Strategic Alignment

The long-lasting Pak-China cooperation was established on the foundation of the diplomatic alignment with the People's Republic of China. In addition to signifying Pakistan's

acknowledgement of China's sovereignty, the decision paved the way for a deep diplomatic relationship that would influence future events in the decades that followed. This fundamental acknowledgement signaled the start of a relationship that would develop and grow, moving beyond diplomatic relations to become an all-encompassing strategic alliance (Ilmas, 2023).

The diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and China in the 1950s and 1960s established a significant and lasting bilateral relationship (Iqtidar Hussain, 2020). The initiation of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China began with the exchange of envoys from 1951 to 1953.

Major General N.M. Raza was appointed as the first ambassador to Peking in July 1951. During this period, there were no political discrepancies between Peking and Karachi. Particularly while China and India enjoyed a friendly relationship, the Pakistan-China border remained tranquil, and China's position on the Kashmir issue was ambiguous. On the economic front, Pakistan and China engaged in trade under a barter agreement established in 1952, where Pakistan exported cotton worth Rs. 97.2 million to China in exchange for coal and jute. This arrangement was followed in 1953 by a more comprehensive trade agreement. Conversely, Pakistan was also receiving financial and technical support from the United States through the "Point-Four Program," which was established with US President Harry S. Truman (Jahangir, 2015).

But with the historic signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1963 marked a turning point that was essential in establishing the developing diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan. This historic agreement signaled the beginning of an extraordinarily strong and diverse bilateral alliance that would subsequently influence the region's geopolitics. The two countries' developing trust and common strategic goals were made concrete by the Treaty of Friendship (Ilmas, 2023).

The diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and China in the 1950s and 1960s established a significant and long-lasting bilateral relationship (Iqtidar Hussain, 2020). To establish "the

boundary between China's Xinjiang and the neighboring areas, which Pakistan effectively controls," the two countries entered into a temporary boundary agreement on March 2, 1963. After the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, both nations solidified their commitment to the demarcation and reopening agreement. This pact resulted in various economic, political, and geopolitical benefits. As a result, Pakistan gained around "750 square miles of territory that provided salt and grazing land, facilitated access to all passes along the Karakoram Range, and included three-quarters of the K-2 peak." A Pakistani editor noted that "It serves as a practical illustration of peaceful coexistence." However, some Western analysts observed that Pakistan's relinquishment of "5,180 square kilometers of land in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh" alongside China's concession of 1,942 square kilometers to Pakistan sparked a deterioration in relations, leading to a "ballistic relationship" (Jahangir, 2015).

Pakistan's official recognition of China's authority over Tibet was one of the treaty's most notable features. This gesture of acknowledgement showed a strong degree of diplomatic unity and emphasized Pakistan's steadfast dedication to its Chinese counterpart. In addition to reaffirming its support for the "One China" policy, Pakistan's recognition of China's territorial claims over Tibet strengthened the mutual respect and trust that served as the cornerstones of the Pak-China relationship (Pant, 2012).

The ties between the two countries began to deepen following this agreement about the boundary and limit issue. The years following 1962 saw a cordial partnership between the two republics at the managerial and public levels. India and Pakistan were engaged in a high-level conflict in 1971. East Pakistan was divided from West Pakistan due to conflict. China was the one who ordered Pakistan to get ethical, financial, and political support to deal with the difficult situation that arose during the 1971 war (Anwar, 2020).

Beyond its symbolic meaning, the Treaty of Friendship opened the door for real collaboration in several areas. It established a foundation for political, military, and economic cooperation, establishing China and Pakistan as vital allies in a world that is changing quickly. As a result, this treaty can be seen as a crucial turning point that increased the strategic importance of their partnership and paved the way for future years of even closer collaboration (Ilmas, 2023).

2.3.5 Pak-India war 1965 and China's support

During the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan, China openly offered economic, diplomatic, and military assistance to Pakistan. China condemned India's "criminal aggression" and warned of severe consequences, while also supporting Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir issue. A trade agreement was established between China and Pakistan that included "most-favorable nation treatment" in areas of trade, commerce, and shipping. Leaders from Pakistan's army, who had transitioned to the navy, frequently visited Peking. As a result, in 1968, China supplied machinery for the Heavy Mechanical Complex in Taxila, amounting to 15 million rupees. Furthermore, China extended millions of dollars in interest-free economic aid to help the development of Pakistan's small businesses and infrastructure. Trade between the two nations experienced fluctuations during the 1950s and 1960s, influenced by Pakistan's political instability and post-war conditions, as well as China's domestic issues stemming from the Cultural Revolution of 1966 (Jahangir, 2015).

2.3.6 Cold war Era (1971-90)

The 1970s saw the emergence of dynamic geopolitical trends in the Cold War due to shifting regional and superpower interests and policies. Maintaining normal relations with Moscow was underlined by Islamabad. However, by designating India as a satellite, Moscow hoped to wean

Islamabad away from Beijing and establish stable bases in Pakistan to gain access to warm waters. However, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian prime at the time, began to portray India as the dominant regional force. Fearing that the Soviet Union might utilize India as a bulwark for Chinese encirclement, China concentrated on normalizing relations with India. While the US was frightened by the Soviet Union's expansionism towards southern Asia, Pakistan and China were alarmed by the superpowers' subdued response to the explosions in India. Even when each country's regime changed, the unique relationship between China and Pakistan persisted. In order to keep the balance of power and keep China in check in South Asia, the US saw India as a possible ally (Jahangir, 2015).

The US utilized Pakistan through China to oppose the USSR during the Afghanistan crisis, and China used Pakistan as a pawn to align itself with the US. Pakistan was therefore at the top of the US agenda. China, however, pledged cooperation against Soviet expansionism after the United States refused to provide Pakistan with arms. Following a request from China, the US eventually removed the military and economic sanctions placed on Pakistan for producing "Islamic atomic bombs." The United States pledged financial and military support to Pakistan, its frontline ally in the fight in Afghanistan (Jahangir, 2015).

During the cold war also, Pakistan wanted stronger ties with China, viewing it as a trustworthy partner. China played a vital role by providing both military and diplomatic support, realizing the need of a friendly and stable Pakistan. China and Pakistan's security objectives coincided during this time, strengthening their strategic alliance. Throughout this time, China's diplomatic and military assistance was crucial in reinforcing their strategic alliance. This support went beyond mere symbolism, demonstrating mutual security concerns and a dedication to regional stability. The strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China during these years would have significant

consequences, impacting not only their own countries but also the wider regional environment, ultimately influencing the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia and beyond. (Ilmas, 2023).

2.3.7 Post Cold War Era and 21st Century Prospects

Pakistan's strategic importance to major nations decreased in the post-Cold War era as a result of the shifting global landscape and its backing of the Taliban. Pakistan has to examine its foreign policy, particularly its security measures, as a result. Following the death of its foe, the US became the only superpower, and the bloc competition came to an end. In the 1990s, China began to emerge as a major force in the unipolar global order. The idea of security has expanded globally to include socioeconomic issues in addition to conventional ones. South Asian nuclearization became a major regional concern for Pakistani and Indian foreign policy. China joined "global non-proliferation regimes," and the USSR and the US have maintained "their nuclear arsenal parallel to disarmament and non-proliferation attempts" from the beginning of the Cold War (Sawhny, 1999).

India, China, and Pakistan's triangular relations were disrupted by the Kashmir dispute. In order to resolve territorial conflicts with India, China temporarily adopted a neutral position on the Kashmir issue. However, India's reluctance to settle territorial disputes with China gave Pakistan and China a footing to fortify their alliance. China did, however, stress that these conflicts should be settled in accordance with UN resolutions. Academic circles believed that Pakistan's interests will only be badly impacted by Delhi-Washington-Islamabad connections. However, in the case of Delhi-Beijing-Islamabad connections, this condition might be altered. It was promised that Pakistan-China relations will always come before China-India relations (Jahangir, 2015).

Additionally, the 1990s saw a flurry of business activity between China and Pakistan. Next to or after the United States, China was rapidly becoming a major economic force. Between 1994 and 1995, Pakistan's imports to China rose to US\$ 70.2 million, while its exports to China surged dramatically to US\$ 30.1 million (Sarwar Hassan, 1999).

China and Pakistan increased their defence relations; Pakistan's defensive capabilities were greatly enhanced by China's military assistance. According to Indian and American intelligence sources, the Chinese were accused of supplying 500 ring magnets to the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, so that it might build its own nuclear and missile programs. Beijing was also charged with transferring nuclear-capable M-11 missiles. China and Pakistan both strongly refuted these accusations. Nevertheless, despite growing pressure from the US, China persisted in enhancing Pakistan's defensive capabilities (Jahangir, 2015).

The strategic importance of the Pakistan-China relationship increased dramatically in the twenty-first century as a result of revolutionary events that altered the nature of their alliance. This change was mostly brought about by the 2013 launch of the CPEC. As a landmark initiative, CPEC marked the beginning of a new phase of cooperation and economic integration between the two countries. The importance of CPEC in regional and international contexts is highlighted by the fact that it is not merely a stand-alone initiative but is deeply interwoven with China's larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This project aims to create essential physical and economic links between China's western region and Pakistan's Gwadar Port. Its main goal is to make trade and energy resources flow more smoothly while also opening up enormous economic opportunities. CPEC is very enormous in both scope and magnitude. The region's economic environment could undergo a radical change as a result of this ambitious project. Some of Pakistan's most urgent developmental needs are met by CPEC, which promotes improved

connectivity, eases trade, and boosts economic growth. Additionally, by increasing connectivity between South Asian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern countries, it promises to foster regional stability and collaboration. It includes numerous large-scale projects in several different industries (Ilmas, 2023).

2.4 History of Pakistan US Relations

Utility and political-economic opportunism have been hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan. One of the first countries to recognize Pakistan's independence in 1947 and work towards forging close ties was the United States. Pakistan first wanted to present itself as a non-aligned member of the international community, but it quickly understood that having a superpower's backing would benefit it. Although Prime Minister Ali Khan made an effort to establish cordial ties with both the US and the Soviet Union, the Soviets turned down Pakistan's request for military assistance since they had already geared themselves towards India. The Prime Minister's 23-day journey to the US on May 3, 1950, following this refusal, is regarded as the first step towards solid defense relations with the United States. (EFSAS, 2017).

There were four main reasons why the two nations' relations were not friendly in the beginning. First, the United States had global interests and a worldwide foreign policy. The US was working to restrict Communism throughout the early stages of the Cold War. As a result, China and Japan were given precedence, and it had no significant foreign policy issues in South Asia.

Additionally, US policymakers believed that Britain would have a major influence in South Asia (Kux, 2001).

The second reason was Pakistan's innate desire to foster fraternal ties with Muslim nations. In this regard, Quaid-i-Azam regularly opposed the establishment of Israel in 1948 and criticized Western policy towards Palestine (Kux, 2001).

Thirdly, Pakistan also wanted to avoid being involved in the major declaration that the nation would not participate in any ideological disputes between other countries that were made as soon as it came into existence. Six months later, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared, "We have a friendly and good-will policy towards all countries worldwide" (Hussain, 2016).

Fourthly, Pakistan faced many difficulties in its early years of independence, including the loss of its economic and military resources, the conflict with India over Kashmir, the refugee crisis, the 1000 miles of hostile Indian territory separating East and West Pakistan, the threat posed by the Durand Line issue on the North West Frontier, and a lack of money to cover government expenses. These challenges caused Pakistan to shift its focus from the global struggles of superpowers to internal or regional difficulties (Hussain, 2016).

Pakistan was in urgent need of military and economic support to overcome the severe security situation it faced. The country reached out to the US for financial aid. However, the US's response to Pakistan's request for \$2 billion in military and economic assistance was unenthusiastic, offering only \$10 million from its relief fund. On March 11, 1948, the US imposed a ban on the supply of military equipment to both countries for the first time, citing the escalating tensions between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue as the reason, instead of providing military help (Kux, 2001).

2.4.1 The Honeymoon Era (1950s)

The 1949 Chinese Revolution startled the United States and forced it to reevaluate its Asian strategy. Furthermore, this concerning circumstance was exacerbated when China and the Soviet Union formed a friendship relationship and mutual aid agreement that lasted for thirty years. Due to its geostrategic placement at the doorstep of China and the former USSR, Pakistan's standing in the eyes of US policymakers strengthened as a result of this regional growth. Pakistan could undoubtedly assist the US in monitoring China and Russia closely. William Campbell observes that Pakistan is one of the "rimland" nations that round the communist core in Asia, and that its strategic and geographical location was the most important component of its geostrategic worth to the US (Hussain, 2016).

The United States' strong assistance for the Pakistani military during the Cold war is a result of their perception of Pakistan as a crucial partner and component in the war against Communism. President Truman's demand that a Central Intelligence Agency be established in Pakistan to closely monitor the Soviet Union was a blatant example of American expediency; nonetheless, this plan ultimately failed. The two States had several collaborative projects during the strongly pro-US regime of Ayub Khan. For example, Ayub Khan gave the Pakistani Air Force permission to utilize Peshawar Airport, which had previously been upgraded with American cash, to launch the U-2 "spy-in-the-sky" that the Americans intended to monitor and collect intelligence against the USSR. Generally speaking, Washington voluntarily spent millions of dollars on military forces and covert operations against the Soviet Union during the "honeymoon" era of US-Pak relations with little responsibility. America viewed Pakistan's military institution, not its political leadership, as a trustworthy ally after realizing the country's critical role in regional defense and the containment of Communism (EFSAS, 2017).

One of the statements recorded at that time from Washington was “In the event that Pakistan is attacked, the US government will respond in line with US policy by using its armed forces and other appropriate measures that may be mutually agreed upon and that are outlined in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East in order to support the Pakistani government upon request” (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

The relationship between the two nations improved during the second Eisenhower term, and Field Marshal Ayub Khan was able to forge close ties with the Americans as Pakistan's president, Ayub Khan, and his country became America's closest allied partner in Asia (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

As Pakistan grew closer towards the US, its relations with China were not on the best terms. Following the initial goodwill, tensions between China and Pakistan increased daily; the mistrust was sparked by Pakistan's relatively gullible stance on China's admission to the UN. Sino-Pak relations were then made worse by the events in Tibet and Taiwan, to which Pakistan responded in a blatantly pro-American way. China even went so far as to warn Pakistan that such policies were "opposing both the national interests of Pakistan and the interest of peace in Asia" (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

2.4.2 Change of Dynamics (1960s-1979)

After the honeymoon period of relations, the US-Pakistan relationship began to fluctuate. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 and the U-2 incident in May 1960 forced the US and Soviet Union to acknowledge the ferocity of their rivalry. In an effort to lessen the threat of war, both enemies sought to reproach. China was seen by the Kennedy administration as posing a bigger threat to the free world than the Soviet Union (Hussain, 2016).

The balance of power in the subcontinent was altered by US military assistance to India. Pakistan thought that US military assistance to India will be utilized against them rather than China. The United States advised Pakistan not to exploit India's problems during the Sino-Indian conflict; and promised to assist in resolving the issue of Kashmir.

But it didn't make any progress in resolving the problem of Kashmir. Ayub Khan started weighing the costs and benefits proportion of Pakistan's US alliance, and as a result forged ties with the Soviet Union and China (Hussain, 2016).

The 1965 Pakistan-India War was a hastily fought and disastrous conflict on Pakistan's vital plain. It did, however, bring to light the United States' impartiality in handling Indo-Pak conflicts. Pakistan's long-standing position as a U.S. ally was ended (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

Both India and Pakistan were subject to US embargoes during the 1965 Pak-India war. Given that India was already acquiring armaments from the Soviet Union, Pakistan suffered more from this circumstance than India did. China now provided assistance to Pakistan (Hussain, 2016).

Following the conclusion of the 1965 War, US policy towards Pakistan began to deteriorate. This change in US policy has multiple causes. First, US decision-makers concluded that American forces were being wasted and that the Indo-Pak conflict had pulled both nations away from true regional agreement. Second, détente between two superpowers was expanding at the time. Anti-Soviet sentiment was waning, and the US was having important discussions on nuclear weapons management. The political and strategic objectives of the US and Pakistan did not align during this time (Hussain, 2016).

Henry Kissinger cleared the path for Sino-US détente in 1971 with a covert visit to China via Islamabad. It enhanced Pakistan's ties with the US and lessened US security concerns in South

Asia. India and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation at the same time. Pakistan was divided as a result of India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan, which sparked the third Indo-Pak War. Pakistan requested assistance against Indian aggression during this war by invoking the Security Pact of 1959, but the US denied the request on the grounds that it did not view India as a Communist State (Hussain, 2016).

General Agha Muhammad Yahya, the leader of the Pakistani Party Awami League, defeated incumbent President Ayub Khan in the 1970 election, but the government refused to cede its authority to the newly elected administration. Pakistan's rulers ignored the country's internal issues in order to further their own interests and maintain a tight relationship with the US government. But this turned out to be a deadly phony nation. and the state of Bangladesh was created as a result (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

The US acknowledged India as the leading force in South Asia after Pakistan was split apart in 1971. By voicing their complaints against its erstwhile colonizers, Pakistan also changed the direction of its foreign policy and developed positive ties with the "Third World" nations.

Pakistan has emphasized its pan-Islamist relations with the Muslim world. The purpose of the ties with the Islamic states was to make up for Washington's loss of assistance. After the events of 1971 essentially rendered Pakistan's membership in SEATO ludicrous, the country joined the Non-Alignment Movement. It kept up its membership in CENTO, primarily because of its connections with Iran and Turkey rather than the US (Hussain, 2016).

Establishing stability within the country was Prime Minister Bhutto's primary goal. The biggest challenge for the new administration arose when India carried out an underground nuclear test in May 1974. This event forced Pakistan to seek a nuclear weapons program capable of rivaling India's. The US government became increasingly apprehensive about this development.

Consequently, sanctions were enacted against Pakistan during the Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

In 1975, to have the arms embargo from 1965 lifted, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a trip to the United States. While he succeeded in removing the arms embargo, the US overlooked India's nuclear test and continued to provide support to India, raising alarms in Pakistan. On March 18, 1976, Pakistan and France finalized an agreement to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility to counter India's conventional and unconventional military superiority. In response to this agreement, the US reacted sharply under its non-proliferation policy. Pakistan received implicit threats from the US to act as an example for other nations (Kux, 2001).

Jimmy Carter became president of the United States in 1979. He placed a strong emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, in addition to pressuring France to halt its agreement with Pakistan about the sale of a nuclear processing unit, the Carter administration also compelled Pakistan to refrain from acquiring nuclear capabilities. The end of economic assistance during this time also marked the lowest point in Pakistan-US relations (Hussain, 2016).

Additionally, a crowd in 1979 destroyed the American embassy in Islamabad, killing some of its staff members, because they thought America was responsible for the attack on the Great Mosque in Makkah. Following this event, US-Pakistan relations deteriorated to about as bad as any country in the world (Kux, 2001).

2.4.3 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979

The love-hate relationship between the US and Pakistan peaked in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both nations shared the objective of opposing the Soviet rule. Billions of cash were transported from Washington to Islamabad with the goal of bolstering the region's

endangered national security. Many of them were supporting the "Mujahedeen," anti-Soviet rebel organizations that received covert military training and went on to create the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic outfit that the US is ironically today fighting as part of its "War on Terror."

US foreign policy towards Pakistan underwent significant changes as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet military invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan faced a two-front security scenario as a result of Soviet participation in Afghanistan since its two provinces, Baluchistan and NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), shared a border with Afghanistan. Because of its geostrategic significance, the US required Pakistan as a frontline state in response to these negative regional circumstances. General Zia, the president of Pakistan at the time, was called by US President Carter, who informed him that the US wished to re-establish the 1959 bilateral security arrangement with Pakistan in order to fortify its defense against communist attack (Hussain, 2016).

Jimmy Carter authorized a larger covert action program on December 29, 1979, which directed CIA to supply military equipment and ammunition to the Afghan anticommunist fighters, who were quickly referred to as mujahideen. Pakistan was a trustworthy friend of the US at this time, and the US assisted Pakistan in developing its nuclear capabilities (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

In a statement to Congress on January 21, 1980, President Carter begged for the required aid for Pakistan, saying, "As the first order of business, I am asking Congress to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan defend itself" (Kux, 2001).

That offer was referred to as peanuts by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. “Pakistan will not exchange its security for \$400 million”, he declared; the aid must be proportionate to the threat's magnitude (Kux, 2001).

After the completion of Carter’s term, President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. President Reagan made an effort to strengthen relations with Pakistan. Compared to the previous administration, the current one showed more sympathy for Pakistan. In 1981, the US negotiated a deal to provide \$3.2 billion in aid to Pakistan, which was later extended over six years (1981–87). On average, the United States provided over \$1.74 billion in military assistance. Another \$4.2 billion package for the years 1988–1993 was approved in the spring of 1986. The sale of advanced aircraft like the F-16 was part of this help package. (Hussain, 2016).

2.4.4 Decline of Relations in the 90s.

In 1989, as the Cold War was coming to a close and the Soviet Union was nearing its dissolution, President George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency. His administration opted to maintain its existing significant policy towards South Asia during this period, given the unpredictability of the shifting international relations. In February 1989, after the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan, Bush's administration tried to foster a close connection with Pakistan. The evidence was President G. H.W. Bush's repeated assurances of the United States' commitment to Pakistan's security and economic growth during Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's June 1989 visit. Additionally, he asked the Congress to keep giving Pakistan \$240 million in military aid and \$380 million in economic aid for the 1990–1991 fiscal year (VAN, 2020).

However, as soon as the communist forces in Afghanistan were driven out, ties between the United States and Pakistan rapidly worsened. After President G. H. W. Bush ceased to guarantee

Pakistan's nuclear development, the U.S. Congress punished Pakistan in 1990 by enacting the Pressler Amendment. The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert B. Oakley, wrote to Pakistan President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in September 1990 to inform him of these penalties. The United States later withheld \$700 million in aid to Pakistan for the years 1988–1994 in October 1990. The United States halted its military training programs for Pakistani forces and its purchases of F-16 planes and other military hardware. Military hardware from Pakistan that was shipped to the US for reparations was subject to an embargo (Sattar, 2011).

President Bill Clinton tried to heal the deteriorating ties with Pakistan after the Pressler Amendment after taking office in 1993. The individual who "supported closer Pakistan–U.S. ties" and saw Pakistan as a "potentially useful friend" in western Asia and the Middle East was William Perry, the secretary of defense for the United States. The U.S. Congress passed the Brown Amendment in October 1995, which weakened the Pressler Amendment, during the Clinton administration. The new amendment said that the United States remained opposed to selling Pakistan new military hardware and F-16 jets. However, the Congress gave the Clinton administration permission to provide Pakistan with military hardware that had been sought prior to October 1, 1990. Additionally, the new amendment gave President Clinton the authority to sell aircraft to foreign nations and reimburse Pakistan for the money it had given the United States. The Harkin-Warner Amendment, which allowed the United States Congress to restart its democracy-building efforts in Pakistan, including military training and the promotion of American exports to Pakistan, was enacted in July 1997. As long as Pakistan has a democratically elected government, Senator Harkin and other sponsors have specifically pushed for the goal of resuming the training program for the country that was supported by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. However, the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee did not approve

military ties between the United States and Pakistan through the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program. All of these changes, however, are a reflection of the better bilateral ties between the United States and Pakistan under the Clinton administration (VAN, 2020).

2.4.5 Revival of relations post 9/11

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship had been deteriorating since the late 1990s when President G. W. Bush entered office in January 2001. G. W. Bush put his "India first" policy into effect in South Asia during his new presidency. However, the United States' "India first" policy was thwarted by the terrorist events on September 11, 2001. The G. W. Bush administration believed that "terrorism," rather than the "China threat," was now the United States' biggest threat. The Bush administration thought that Pakistan would be crucial to American operations in Afghanistan specifically and the fight against Taliban terrorism in general. This notion was based on Pakistan's crucial geographical location, but more significantly, its significance in the Muslim world and its strong relationship with the Taliban (VAN, 2020).

When U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin met with Pakistani President Musharraf on September 13, 2001, he conveyed his hope that Pakistan will assist and collaborate with the United States in its fight against terrorism. Simultaneously, the Pakistan Ambassador to the United States and Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligent (ISI) received a list of seven requirements from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, which included the following: (1) halting Al-Qaeda's activities along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and cutting off all logistical support for Bin Laden; (2) allowing the United States to fly over and land on Pakistani territory for military and intelligence purposes; (3) supplying the United States with intelligence information; (4) permitting the United States and its allies to conduct military and other intelligence

operations against Al-Qaeda in Pakistani territory; (5) continuing to publicly denounce terrorist acts; (6) preventing the Taliban and other prohibited terrorists from accessing any fuel sources; (7) cutting off ties with the Taliban government if it continued to shield Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (VAN, 2020).

All of Washington's sanctions against Pakistan, including those related to the 1999 coup and nuclear issues, were promptly withdrawn in October 2001 when Pakistan agreed to the list of U.S. requests. From this moment on, the military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan was rapidly reinforced (VAN, 2020).

Under President General Pervaiz Musharraf, Pakistan was on the verge of becoming a "failed state," and Washington policymakers were constantly worried about its nuclear and missile programs. The US-Pakistan relationship was once again altered by 9/11. Several hundred Al-Qaeda members have been apprehended by Pakistan in recent years, and the country's economy has experienced a macroeconomic recovery (Ambreen Javaid, 2014).

History of US China Relations (1950-Present)

For the first twenty years of the Cold War, the United States and the People's Republic of China were at odds. The United States' position on Taiwan infuriated China. In the early stages of the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union worked together to develop anti-American policies and implement them. The cooperation against the United States began to deteriorate and eventually disintegrate in the late 1960s as the interests of China and the Soviet Union began to diverge and clash. Soon after, the United States began to enhance engagement with China and normalize relations with it, seeing the time as favorable. Henry Kissinger and other American officials' visits to China helped to normalize the relationship, and President Richard Nixon later succeeded

in transforming the antagonistic relationship between the United States and China into one of collaboration. Furthermore, although Taiwan is only a part of China, the United States reversed its position on the island and designated the People's Republic of China to be the actual representation of China to the UN. Since the 1970s, the US has pursued a policy of collaboration with China. The first was because the United States believed that in order to limit the Soviet Union, it would be advantageous to cultivate positive relations with China. The second reason was to engage with China in order to profit economically. China became a desirable destination for US foreign direct investment after implementing reforms in the late 1970s. China's economic growth was further stimulated when the United States later assisted China in joining the World Trade Organization (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024).

The Cold War, which arose between the US and the USSR following World War II, was characterised by "largely political and economic clashes." Many Americans became worried that communists or communist sympathisers were infiltrating their government and society as USSR agents, endangering the country's security, as this rivalry created friction across the country. As anti-communist sentiment swept the United States, the allegiance of public servants, Hollywood celebrities, and employees in numerous other sectors was called into question (Monroe, 2014).

The US and China did not get along well at the time since China was a communist nation.

International developments only served to intensify anticommunist hysteria. The North Korean People's Army invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. South Korea received assistance from the United States and the United Nations. Chinese troops stepped in and started supporting North Korea after South Korean, U.S., and UN forces got close to the country's border with China. Additionally, the Soviet Union supported North Korean forces, which heightened Americans' apprehension about communism. The sides to the conflict signed an armistice agreement in 1953

when the conflict came to a standstill (Monroe, 2014). This conflict made the relations between the two nations even worse.

The PRC and USSR's relationship started to deteriorate in the late 1950s. The two communist powers started to separate where they had previously aligned. Because Mao Zedong refused to accept Khrushchev's demand that the USSR be permitted to set up a Soviet naval communications centre in China and take complete operational control of their fleet, the USSR did not provide military assistance during the first or second Taiwan Strait Crises. The separation made it possible for the United States and China to get closer.

President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 was a significant turning point in the U.S.-China relationship. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Advisor, met with Premier Zhou Enlai and other high-ranking officials in Beijing in July 1971 in order to prepare for the president's visit the following year. The two countries had been apart for 25 years before Nixon's visit. Gaining leverage against the Soviet Union and fostering better ties and communication between the United States and China were the two goals of the trip. Nixon travelled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai for the eight-day visit, when he met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The Shanghai Communiqué, which was released by the PRC and the U.S. government at the conclusion of the tour, stated that normalizing diplomatic relations would be beneficial for all parties (Monroe, 2014).

In May 1973, a PRC equivalent office was formed in Washington, and the United States Liaison Office was established in Beijing. President Carter reaffirmed the Shanghai Communiqué's objectives in 1977. A joint statement establishing full diplomatic ties was released by the governments of the PRC and the United States in December 1978. Deng Xiaoping began implementing economic and social reforms in 1980 with the goal of bettering the lives of

Chinese people. These changes included decollectivizing agriculture, enabling citizens to own enterprises, and opening China to foreign investment. In order to capitalize on the increased market prospects, foreign businesses flocked to China. Contact between the two countries increased after that. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan became the third American president to visit China (Monroe, 2014).

The first Chinese leader to visit the United States in more than ten years was Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1997. The next year, President Clinton travelled to China to talk about Taiwan. Although the visits showed that relations were once again getting better, they suffered another setback in 1999. During a NATO incursion in Yugoslavia on May 7, 1999, U.S. bombs unintentionally hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three people and wounding twenty more. The maps provided to NATO were out of date, although the bombardment was intended to target a munitions storage warehouse. Despite President Bill Clinton's prompt apologies and claim that the bombing was an accident, Chinese media took a while to report the apology, and anti-American demonstrations broke out all around China as Chinese nationals assaulted American property, especially the American embassy in Beijing (Monroe, 2014).

By the close of the 20th century, China and its expanding power had somewhat alarmed the United States. However, following 2001, the United States' focus was shifted away from China's growing influence and towards the fight against terrorism.

With Trump as president, the United States formally recognized China's danger.

As a result of its economic expansion, China has emerged as a major, powerful, and influential player in 21st-century world affairs. China's "Opening Up" policy and a number of other reforms that were enacted nearly forty years ago are responsible for this economic expansion. These

policies made it possible for China to engage with the outside world, which promoted trade between the rest of the world and China, a nation with inexpensive labour. The seeds for China's reforms were planted by Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded Mao as leader of the country. He was committed to using lessons learnt from the past and implementing policies in China that would support its growth and development. He aimed to accomplish this by eliminating every component of China's governance structure that was preventing it from producing positive outcomes. He first relaxed authority over the provinces. He also abolished the communes. Thirdly, he increased and expedited Chinese production. Furthermore, the agriculture industry was restructured. Through the establishment of "Special Economic Zones," he also introduced China to international trade and offered China investment opportunities. Furthermore, the "state-owned enterprises" were largely instructed to function autonomously. China became the "second-largest economy" as a result of these successful strategies. Nonetheless, China is the world's first economy since the middle of the previous decade in terms of "purchasing power parity." After meeting domestic demands, China's remarkable agricultural output is exported despite its enormous population. China now holds the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world, surpassing Washington's, thanks to its economic expansion (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024).

With Trump as president, the United States formally recognized China's danger. Trump's primary goal upon becoming office in the US was to alter Washington's approach to China. He reaffirmed that America's approach to China has been a major failure and that a new strategy that takes into account China's aspirations and challenge to Washington's dominance is required. He named China and Russia as big threats in 2017 and said the US would use this strategy to challenge its adversaries (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024).

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Hedging Theory in International Relations

The phrase "hedging" entered the international relations (IR) lexicon in the 1990s when academics and pundits started referring to state conduct in which a nation adopts a middle ground between the two simple approaches of balancing and "bandwagoning," exhibiting a combination of selective engagement, limited resistance, and partial deference (Johnston, 1999).

International relations has borrowed the concept of hedging from the financial world. It is commonly described as a "third way" between bandwagoning and balancing, a middle ground that states seek to offset risks by pursuing a number of policy options that are meant to have mutually counteracting effects in high-stakes and high-uncertainty situations (Boni, 2021).

Hedging is a collection of tactics that enables governments to take use of several connections for economic and security advantages while avoiding exclusive alignments with a single power.

Hedging, which has its roots in liberalism and realism, describes how states attempt to balance against strong enemies (realism) and cooperate economically and diplomatically (liberalism) (Noshawan Adil, 2024).

In that sense, hedging typically refers to a national security or alignment strategy that combines elements of cooperation and confrontation between two states. It is frequently compared to the ideas of balancing and bandwagoning, which were created during the Cold War to illustrate different approaches to opposing or compromising with a powerful or intimidating major power. As academics studied the new dynamics of international politics in the post-Cold War era and

discovered that existing theoretical frameworks were insufficient, the concept of hedging emerged (John D Ciorciari, 2019).

The idea of hedging aims to answer a number of important concerns regarding the theory and practice of modern international relations. When emerging powers pose a threat to a state's security interests, how do governments often react? How can they defend themselves from the risk of abandonment when they establish protective relationships with a friendly great power? Above all, how do those who make decisions on foreign policy attempt to address security issues in a very unpredictable global setting? Bandwagoning and balancing theories, which tended to concentrate on how governments react to recognised threats, were unable to provide a persuasive response to these problems. As a result, those theories proposed a dichotomy in which states attempted to reduce risk in unclear strategic situations rather than adopting a definite stance to deal with known threats or follow the lead of a rising great power (John D Ciorciari, 2019).

A combination of modest resistance, partial deference, and selective engagement define this strategy. It usually refers to a state's national security or alignment policy with another state, which combines elements of cooperation and confrontation. But in a more comprehensive sense, hedging refers to a purposefully ambiguous policy that is carried out covertly since openly endorsing it would provoke opposition from other superpowers. There is disagreement on the definition and application of the term "hedging" in international relations, despite its widespread use. The main cause of this is the false belief that hedging indicates indecision or fence-sitting (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

At least four main conceptualizations of hedging have been developed from the literature.

According to the first conceptualization, hedging is a reaction to perceived risk in the context of particular economic and strategic weaknesses. This includes, for example, works on energy

security. Second, hedging is seen of as an alignment decision made to deal with security issues, such those that small and medium-sized nations face in comparison to major countries. Relevant works, particularly those pertaining to East Asia, frequently have a triangle focus, typically including the United States and China. According to a third conceptualization, hedging is a strategy for controlling the risks connected to specific alignment decisions with respect to one or more major powers. Perhaps the most prevalent (and, as we shall see, the most problematic) conceptualization is the fourth main one. Hedging as a mixed policy approach is its main focus. In the context of interactions between great powers and between small/middle powers and a rising power, hedging is thus seen as a combination of engagement¹ and activities that essentially serve the objective of deterrence (Haacke, 2019).

Despite being used for many years, hedging is still a very controversial and misinterpreted idea in both academic and policy circles (Darren Lim, 2015).

Many people in the policy community consider hedging to be controversial and perhaps undesirable. Big powers don't like that kind of behavior. States that are smaller and secondary deny hedging. Many spectators and government representatives write off hedging as impractical, passive, and speculative. Hedging is also criticized by some as risky since it creates instability and uncertainty. China and the United States (USA), which see themselves as the main targets of hedging, have regularly voiced their disapproval of this practice. They advise states that engage in hedging to cease doing so and reject it as opportunistic. Both Beijing and Washington put pressure on weaker states to provide unambiguous and consistent signals, particularly those in Southeast Asia, which is currently the primary theatre of the US-China conflict. Directly or indirectly, small states are pressured to follow the crowd and make the "right" decision. The goal of the US and its allies is to convince smaller nations to share accountability for "maintaining the

rules-based order." China, on the other hand, positions itself as the "wave of the future" and urges the same nations to work together to "build a community of common destiny" (Kuik, 2021).

Almost all nations have avoided using the term, let alone identifying with it, primarily due to the widespread misconception that associates hedging with either indecision, fence-sitting, or both. The terms "nonaligned," "neutral," or "equidistant" are typically used to characterize the policies of smaller and weaker states, especially those that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Whatever the term, smaller governments do engage in hedging in a variety of ways. The practice of hedging is one that is carried out covertly. Otherwise, the exact goals of this purposefully vague act would be defeated and unwelcome opposition from the rival superpowers would be invited. Developing strong ties with both rival superpowers (aiming for the best results), maximising protection to offset various risks under uncertainty (preparing for the worst cases), and, finally, keeping all options open for as long as possible are the goals of hedging (Kuik, 2021).

4. Pakistan's Hedging Approach towards US China so far

In the years after gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan demonstrated one of the earliest instances of managing its relations with the United States and China. On the one hand, Pakistan complied with the US-led defense agreements, specifically the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), also referred to as the Manila Pact. These agreements were designed to limit the Soviet threat in the Middle East and South-

East Asia, respectively. Pakistan, on the other hand, was eager to build relations with China and persuade its neighbor that its support for the West was not directed at Beijing. Twenty-five years later, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was able to take advantage of its strategic location in the resistance movement. Since the US relied on Pakistani military and intelligence services to support and train the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupiers, Pakistan's tight relations with the US during this time are widely documented. It is less well known that China was able to provide Pakistan with substantial military assistance during that time. These historical instances show that Pakistan learnt throughout the Cold War that it could continue to have contacts with both Beijing and Washington while also reaping the benefits of managing its relations with both. (Boni, 2021).

Throughout the Cold War, Pakistan maintained ties with China while standing with the US against the erstwhile Soviet Union, preserving this balance. In fact, Pakistan was instrumental in assisting Washington in starting talks with Beijing in the early 1970s. Additionally, this made it simpler for Pakistan to defend its simultaneous alliance with the US and China (Siddiqa, 2023).

The relationship between China and the United States, as well as the possible effects on Pakistan's relations with both nations, are well known to Pakistan's strategic strategists. There are differing views, nevertheless, regarding the implications of the US-China rivalry for regional strategic stability and how it would impact Islamabad's ties with the US. One aspect of Pakistan's present relationship with the US is its ongoing assistance in Afghanistan. The United States is still Pakistan's biggest export market and the top destination for the nation's elite, despite a decline in military and financial support. In contrast, China has emerged as Pakistan's leading military supplier and has initiated remarkable economic cooperation through the \$62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In addition, Pakistani strategists look to China to

help energize the Kashmir issue globally and to offer a clear competitor to India, something the US does not do. According to this reasoning, Pakistani decision-makers ought to exercise caution when handling bilateral ties with both nations that hold significance for Pakistan. They shouldn't stay away from them entirely. Pakistan desires to take back its position as a bridge state (Abdul Saboor, 2022).

Pakistan, which describes its policy as "strategic and necessary balancing," is in a state of uncertainty in contrast to India, an American ally and major player in the US' Indo-Pacific strategy. In reality, the strategy leaves Pakistan vulnerable to any benefits that may arise from the situation and the readiness of China or the US to step in and make investments. It is the antithesis of an Islamabad-based proactive strategy. The basic idea of the entire strategy is that, despite China's increasing might, American dominance is still being largely supplanted (Siddiq, 2023).

Pakistan's hedging strategy influences its actions in this situation, allowing it to avoid the risks and consequences of bandwagoning or balancing. The rise of China as an economic and strategic opponent of the US has complicated Pakistan's foreign strategy. Pakistan has evolved a "hedging" strategy to manage this complicated environment, protecting against American threats and warnings related to the fight on terrorism but simultaneously preserving its connections with both states (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

Middle-power states use hedging, a smart foreign policy tactic, to successfully negotiate challenging international landscapes characterized by fierce great power competition. In order to optimize possible advantages and minimize hazards, this strategy entails concurrently diversifying and balancing diplomatic, economic, and security ties. In order to preserve strategic flexibility and autonomy in a volatile global environment, states that implement hedging tactics steer clear of being overly dependent on any one power. Hedging has become a key tactic for

Pakistan, a nation strategically situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, in response to the rivalry between the US, China, and Russia, especially since 2013 (Nosherwan Adil, 2024).

Hedging has become a key tactic for Pakistan, a nation strategically situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, in reaction to the US-China competition. Pakistan now operates in a complicated environment as a result of the growing rivalry between the US and China. In South Asia, the US, a historically important ally, has taken a vacillating stance marked by engagement and estrangement. In the meantime, the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and increased strategic collaboration between the two nations have been facilitated by China's economic and military ascent to prominence. Pakistan's hedging approach in response to these shifting dynamics include keeping close relations with all three powers. Through hedging, Pakistan may take advantage of the economic advantages of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), leverage US military and economic assistance, and strengthen its defence capabilities through interactions with Russia. Pakistan improves its strategic autonomy by reducing the risks of great power rivalry by broadening its relationships and avoiding total reliance on any one country (Boni, 2021).

Pakistan's shift from bandwagoning to hedging policies towards the US increased after the US-Pakistan collaboration in the fight against terrorism deteriorated and China rose to prominence in late 2010. Using a hedging strategy against an uncertain future, Pakistan tries to maintain positive relations with both China and the US in order to secure its survival as an asymmetric power between two fierce rivals engaged in a fierce strategic competition for influence and regional hegemony (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

5. Pakistan's tilt towards China and Decline of US Pak Alliance in the Recent Years

A few factors are mentioned below which add to the shift of Pakistan US alliance to a more hedging approach adopted by Pakistan towards the US and its tilt towards China.

5.1 US Unfulfilled Expectations on War on Terrorism

Since 2009, a number of reasons that have contributed to a widening gap in their goals and interests have caused the partnership between the US and Pakistan to significantly deteriorate. The drop in US military and economic assistance for Pakistan during America's participation in the War on Terror from 2001 to 2009 has been a significant factor in this fall. The partnership, since the United States views Pakistan's collaboration as crucial to the fight against terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, has never acknowledged the US accusations that it supports the Haqqani Network; rather, it has seen the US' growing strategic alliance with India as a possible danger to the security of its country (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

Since it was discovered in 2011 that Osama bin Laden was residing close to the Pakistani military's garrison town of Abbottabad, ties between the United States and Pakistan have had more lows than highs. This incident sparked a close examination of the two countries' relationship and led Congress to urge a reexamination of the rationale behind giving Pakistan financial and military support. Pakistan has always placed a high priority on its ties with the United States because of the latter's substantial defense and security aid, which was crucial to Pakistan's security environment. The Pakistani military did not adopt the U.S. strategic objective of combating terrorism as a strategic doctrine in spite of that support. Additionally, the United

States was unable to persuade Islamabad to abandon a security strategy that was centered on India. The United States and Pakistan's relationship became increasingly strained and aloof as a result of Pakistan's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and outsourcing of security by depending on terrorist groups. By 2011, congressional investigations into Pakistan's use of U.S. assistance appropriations had begun as U.S. politicians started to question Pakistan's motives and ability as a partner (Hassan, 2022).

Numerous terrorist groups have established safe havens in Pakistan, but unlike the US, China is casually ignoring this expanding segment of the population that turns to violence. China has been openly supporting Pakistan in the wake of Osama bin Laden's assassination, asserting that Pakistani intelligence officers were ignorant of his existence within the nation's borders. Furthermore, after terrorist leader Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who was detained for his involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks led by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was released from prison due to a lack of evidence, China used its influence as a permanent member of the UNSC to halt Indian intervention in Pakistan. Although the UNSC has passed many resolutions addressing the need for coordinated efforts to combat terrorism, China has often exercised its veto power to protect terrorist groups and individuals. Although Pakistani authorities have publicly denied any involvement in any of the terrorist groups, China is aware of their connections to the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). China's determination to forge a solid alliance is evident in its backing of Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy (EFSAS, 2017).

Post-2013 US-Pakistan ties, which are marked by a complex combination of strategic calculations, shared interests, and changing geopolitical dynamics, have placed a strong emphasis on military assistance and security cooperation. Periods of conditional collaboration

and significant military assistance, mostly focused on counterterrorism initiatives, have characterized this relationship. Due to counterterrorism cooperation, the US departure from Afghanistan, and varying levels of economic assistance, US-Pakistan ties have fluctuated between hostility and cooperation since 2013. Despite animosity between the two countries, Pakistan's role in promoting peace negotiations and intelligence sharing is one of the crucial issues. These conflicts were brought to light by President Trump's administration's 2018 reduction to military aid (Hassan, 2022).

Operations like Zarb-e-Azb, which targeted militant strongholds in 2014, were the result of US pressure on Pakistan to take action against the Haqqani network after 2013. The collaboration has greatly improved Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities and disrupted terrorist networks in the nation, despite sporadic disagreements over CSF conditionality, such as the Trump administration's 2018 suspension of \$300 million as mentioned above due to perceived procrastination. In addition to strengthening regional security, this collaboration has brought attention to Pakistan's strategic significance in international counterterrorism initiatives. The United States chastised Pakistan for selectively targeting terrorists and for aiding organizations involved in regional insurgencies, despite initiatives including as Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, which targeted militants in North Waziristan. In order to lessen the economic effects of the 2018 assistance suspension, Pakistan chose to pursue a hedging strategy by stepping up its ties with China and moving forward with CPEC projects (Noshawan Adil, 2024).

Throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan was largely dependent on American military and economic assistance. The United States provided billions of dollars in military aid through a number of programs, including USAID, the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), International Military Education & Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Funding (FMF).³¹

Pakistan complied with American requests in the ongoing war on terror in exchange. However, Pakistan's alleged slowness and lack of cooperation against extremist groups led to the Trump and Obama administrations withholding or terminating military funding, which strained ties between the United States and Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan looked for other allies, like China, to lessen its reliance on the US, which helped China overtake the US in terms of weaponry sales to Pakistan (Iftikhar Ali, 2024).

Furthermore, the US-Pakistan collaboration has not developed into an ideological alliance but rather has remained transactional, largely centred on the war against terrorism or communism. Because of this, the connection has been classified as an alliance without any legally binding commitments and without the appearance of a strategic partnership. It has not been a true alliance or strategic partnership, as evidenced by the fact that it has instead been founded on shared needs and interests (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

5.2 US India Alliance

A further complication for Pakistan is the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy, in which India is essential in tackling continental issues faced by China, including the transfer of advanced military technology (weapons) and geospatial intelligence to New Delhi, presents Pakistan with additional difficulties. The U.S. Indo-Pacific plan does not include Pakistan. U.S. authorities claim that nuclear security, Pakistan's proximity to China, and terrorist safe havens are among the country's interests. Furthermore, Pakistan is now dependent on China to improve its conventional and nuclear capabilities as the US no longer supplies it with military or defense hardware. Pakistan has been de-hyphenated as strategic ties between the United States and India have become deeper (Hassan, 2022).

Because of the power disparity with India, Pakistan has been making a concerted effort to strengthen its struggling economy and solve security concerns. For the past 70 years, the two countries have been at odds over the Kashmir issue, which led to three wars in 1948, 1965, and 1999. Pakistan has therefore always seen India as a possible danger, which has resulted in a foreign policy that is strongly centred on India and in line with US interests. Pakistan's inherent importance in furthering US objectives has been further diminished by the US dehyphenation program, which aims to break historical links with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan has responded by hedging against US policies as a result of the US-Pakistan relationship becoming largely transactional. On the other hand, India has been receiving more attention from the US in its policy debates (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

The United States and India's shared interests have increased in recent years. However, a major change in ties took place just after Narendra Modi was sworn in as India's prime minister in 2014. India and the United States share a close relationship. After the two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in 2008, the US was able to deepen its new strategic engagement with India, which led to the establishment of bilateral ties. In order to confront and resolve global concerns, U.S. President Barack Obama re-established a strategic partnership with India in 2009, naming it a Global Strategic Partnership. According to Barack Obama, India is a "defining 21st Century Partnership" that will be crucial to achieving US strategic goals both globally and in the Asia-Pacific area. Another crucial component of this strategic partnership is defense industry cooperation. It is obvious that India has been working hard to advance in South Asia and compete with China on both an economic and military level. India's main objective in fortifying its strategic alliances with the US is to someday consider itself a regional powerhouse. The United States also wants to see Indian growth outpace China's (Abdul Saboor, 2022).

India and the United States have become more closer as a result of their strategic cooperation. The United States no longer considers Pakistan to be as significant in the context of this strategic cooperation. Pakistan's significance to US policymakers has diminished as a result of the Indo-US alignment of objectives against China. India is now the most significant state in Washington's goal to restrict China in the present Sino-US conflict. This has made it possible for India to win American backing on a number of problems (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024).

Pakistan is attempting to become less dependent on the US and is advancing closer to China in this changing geopolitical landscape. This "has more to do with China's grand strategy of integrating proximate regions to mainland China with trade and infrastructure projects than it does with US policy," claims Dr. Asfandyar Mir. China was able to gain ground more easily because of Pakistan's faltering economy and the US's reluctance to give hard currency for defence and economic requirements. China's substantial involvement would have made it difficult for Pakistan to reject China's advances, even if US policies had been more supportive of Pakistan (Mir, 2019).

5.3 BRI and CPEC

The BRI is best described as a socio-economic connectivity strategy that revives historic international trade routes from the Silk Road era. Along with building infrastructure, they also work to improve trade and investment, promote policy consistency among member nations, foster human interactions, and promote the integration of the financial sector. To facilitate the movement of ideas, capital, and business agreements, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promises to build as many digital roads, highways, harbours, and trains as feasible. CPEC is a new silk road that embraces this historical global goal to expand and revitalise the ancient silk

route's golden age and implement a modern, world silk motorway. As a prototype connectivity project, CPEC aims to enhance physical connectivity, optimise trade routes, and foster cross-border cultural exchange to support economic growth in Asia and globally, embodying the spirit of the Silk Road (Muhammad Ghaffar, 2024).

The most significant initiative for Pakistan's growth and advancement is CPEC. An extension of China's larger Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) gives Beijing quick and convenient access to the Gulf and Indian Ocean nations. But the Sino-US rivalry could not be eliminated from the CPEC project. Washington has previously supported the CPEC during the Obama Administration because it would benefit Pakistan's economy. Later, Washington's position on CPEC shifted as a result of the Trump Administration's shift in Beijing policy. It began to criticise the initiative by making claims that it was a "debt trap" (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024)

Particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become a significant strategic partner for Pakistan. This complex alliance, which has political, military, and economic facets, has a big impact on Pakistan's foreign policy and growth path after 2013. With more than \$60 billion in investments targeted at improving energy, infrastructure, and transportation, the CPEC, which was introduced in 2013, has had a revolutionary impact on Pakistan. The Gwadar Port, which gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea and increases Pakistan's geopolitical significance, and the Karakoram Highway renovation, which improves trade routes, are two of the major projects. By contributing roughly 17,000 MW to the national grid, CPEC's energy projects, like the Sahiwal Coal Power Project, seek to alleviate Pakistan's ongoing power shortages. The Multan-Sukkur Motorway and the Lahore Orange Line Metro Train have also greatly enhanced

urban mobility and transit. Additionally, CPEC has stimulated economic growth and produced over 75,000 jobs, especially in developing nations like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (Nosherwan Adil, 2024).

At first, the United States welcomed China's engagement in Pakistan cautiously, provided that it would promote economic stability, strengthen the country's capacity to combat extremist organizations, and advance American regional objectives. Washington looked for ways to collaborate with these projects because the CPEC projects were centred on constructing physical infrastructure, like power plants and roadways. But as the project got operationalized, the US started to worry about Chinese investments since they were seen as a component of China's purported "string of pearls" strategy. The US doubts that China-Pakistan economic cooperation can be successful and thinks that Chinese political influence, illiberal governance, and Pakistan's slow and corrupt administrative processes present a threat to individual liberties in Pakistan (Iftikhar Ali, 2024).

The approach and demeanor of the US towards CPEC shifted significantly as the Trump administration readied itself to adopt a much firmer position on China compared to the previous administration. Remarks regarding the financial strain that the initiatives would impose on Pakistan, the absence of transparency, and the scarcity of genuine employment opportunities expected to arise for Pakistani laborers under CPEC were clear illustrations of this more confrontational and candidly critical attitude. Pakistan's potential to act as a buffer between the two superpowers has been effectively curtailed by the US's comments and the nation's broader approach to the project. The range of policy options available to Pakistan for a hedging strategy has drastically decreased. Up to the end of 2021, Islamabad has made unsuccessful attempts to patch things up with the US and restore bilateral relations (Boni, 2021).

6. Pakistan's current Foreign Policy and Strategic

Dilemma

Pakistan first utilized a restricted bandwagoning approach in order to avoid US coercive activities. However, Pakistan adopted a hedging strategy that rejected both pure bandwagoning and pure balancing as China's influence increased and the US voiced reservations about China's CPEC project under the BRI strategy. In order to avoid becoming sucked into superpower conflicts, this choice was made. Strategic balancing is not required for Pakistan's asymmetrical relationship with the US because the majority of the threats the US posed during the under-discussed anti-terrorism partnership were real rather than hypothetical. Purely striking a balance could backfire as well because Pakistan's connection with the Taliban may incite US animosity, transforming hypothetical dangers into actual ones. Pakistan uses a combination of pure-balancing, which involves rejecting the influence of one superpower, and pure-bandwagoning, which involves siding with the other superpower, to preserve equilibrium in its relations with the US and China (Roy Anthony Rogers, 2023).

Recognizing that his nation's foreign policy is entirely dependent on the Chinese government, Pakistan bases its foreign policy on its relations with China. Pakistan emphasised that the foundation of their foreign policy is their relationship with China and that the Pakistani people support their close partnership with China. On matters like the South China Sea and the One China Policy, which the West considers to be arbitrary measures taken by Beijing to control its expansionist tendencies, Islamabad has voiced support for China. Among other things, Pakistan reiterated its "commitment to the One China policy" and China's backing of Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Beijing reaffirmed its commitment to protecting

Pakistan's independence, security, and sovereign rights while also promoting its economic development and prosperity (Abdul Saboor, 2022).

The United States and Pakistan are currently at odds on two key issues. The CPEC, which on the surface seems to be good for Pakistan's economy, is the first problem. Conflicting interests in the war in Afghanistan are the second cause of friction between the United States and Pakistan, which has led to a tense and troubled relationship between the two countries. The United States has already stopped providing Pakistan with military and economic support as it withdraws its forces from Afghanistan and has put pressure on countries and international financial institutions to establish initiatives like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Due to its suspected role in terrorism financing, Pakistan is under intense scrutiny from the FATF, and the United States has not been pleased with its subpar performance in areas like democracy, women's education, security, and minorities (Iftikhar Ali, 2024).

For a number of reasons, Pakistan desires to resume relations with the United States. It seeks to remove the hyphen from the Afghanistan-Pakistan prism used by the US. Recasting the nation's relationship with the United States is necessary to support Pakistan's desire to change its policies to geoeconomics, where the emphasis is on connectivity, trade, and investment. In addition to helping Pakistan deal with its economic problems, economic assistance from the US and its Western allies would enable it to forge new connections outside of China. Additionally, Pakistan's nuclear weapons delivery system is heavily dependent on the United States for military equipment and F-16 fighter jet maintenance. Nevertheless, there remains a significant lack of trust between Washington and Islamabad, and the United States does not appear to be willing to address this (Hassan, 2022).

One such great power that has given Pakistan security guarantees is the United States. However, there have been many ups and downs in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. In exchange for gaining Pakistani support to further the former's objectives, the United States gave Pakistan military and economic help. After recognizing its goals, the United States has consistently left Pakistan alone. But through organizations like the International Monetary Fund, Pakistan continues to be reliant on the United States, both directly and indirectly. It is clear that Pakistan is attempting to adopt a more involved strategy with China in recent years. It was difficult to get away from the United States, but it would be extremely difficult and taxing to get out of its circle. In addition, Pakistan works to ease tensions between China and the United States, which it assisted in normalizing in the 1970s (Dr. Adnan Nawaz, 2024).

The following table provides a summarized overview of Pakistan's bilateral relations with China and the United States over different historical eras. It highlights the trends in these relationships, key events shaping them, and the underlying reasons for shifts in their nature—whether positive or negative. The table also underscores the strategic, economic, and geopolitical implications of these dynamics for Pakistan, offering a clear and comparative perspective for readers to understand the evolution of these crucial partnerships (See Table 1).

Table 1. Historical Dynamics of Pakistan's Bilateral Relations with China and the United States: Trends, Drivers, and Impacts					
Era/Period	Pakistan-China Relations	Reasons/Key Events	Pakistan-US Relations	Reasons/Key Events	Impact on Pakistan
1950s	Developing trust (Good)	Recognition of PRC; Bandung Conference diplomacy; barter trade agreement (coal for cotton); mutual opposition to Indian dominance	Honeymoon period (Good)	US sought allies against Soviet expansion; Pakistan joined SEATO/CENTO; military and economic aid to strengthen alliance	Economic and military support from both sides enhanced Pakistan's infrastructure and defense capabilities.
1960s	Strengthened (Good)	Border agreement (1963); Pakistan's support in Sino-Indian War (1962); diplomatic alignment	Declined post-1965 (Bad)	US support for India during Sino-Indian War; neutrality during Pak-India war (1965); military embargoes	Pakistan leaned further towards China for military and economic needs, deepening the strategic partnership.
1970s	Strategic alignment (Good)	Support in 1971 war; economic cooperation in infrastructure; alignment during Cold War	Strained (Bad)	Sanctions over Pakistan's nuclear ambitions; US pivot towards India post-1971 war	Pakistan secured long-term Chinese support while relations with the US reached a low point due to non-proliferation issues.
1980s	Strong partnership (Good)	Military and economic assistance; alignment against Indian dominance and Soviet expansion	Resurgent (Good)	Collaboration during Soviet-Afghan War; \$3.2 billion aid package including advanced military equipment (e.g., F-16 jets)	Strengthened Pakistan's position in the region with substantial support from both China and the US.
1990s	Neutral (Stable)	Increased trade focus; avoided involvement in regional disputes like Kashmir	Declined (Bad)	Pressler Amendment imposed sanctions; US disengaged post-Soviet withdrawal; withheld military equipment	Limited international support; Pakistan struggled economically and diplomatically.

2000s (Post 9/11)	Strengthened (Good)	Economic cooperation through trade and early CPEC projects; maintained neutrality in War on Terror	Re-engaged (Good)	Key ally in War on Terror; significant military and economic aid restored; focus on counterterrorism	Pakistan regained international relevance but faced criticism over its counterterrorism efforts.
2010s–2020s	Deepened (Good)	CPEC under BRI strengthened economic and strategic ties; continued military collaboration	Declining (Bad)	US criticism over counterterrorism; closer US-India relations; disagreements over Afghanistan withdrawal	Economic reliance on China grew; Pakistan struggled to balance relations amidst growing US-China rivalry.

7. Conclusion

A complex interaction between internal variables, regional dynamics, and external influences has shaped Pakistan's foreign policy. In the past, the nation has maintained a balance in its interactions with global countries, especially China and the United States. However, this balancing act has become more challenging due to the changing global scenario and domestic issues.

A game-changer, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has greatly strengthened Pakistan's strategic and economic ties with China. CPEC has sparked worries about Pakistan's strategic independence and its relationship with the US, despite the fact that it has enormous potential for infrastructural modernization and economic growth. Conversely, the US has attempted to moderate China's increasing influence in the region and has voiced reservations about it.

Pakistan's internal political environment, which is frequently marked by instability and political polarization, exacerbates the country's strategic predicament. Its foreign policy decisions have also been influenced by the nation's security issues, such as terrorism and extremism.

Pakistan's long-standing diplomatic engagements with China and the United States have had a profound impact on its economic trajectory, but the outcomes reflect both opportunities and limitations. Over the decades, strategic alignments have provided Pakistan with economic assistance, trade partnerships, and infrastructure development, yet its overall economic growth and ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) remain below global and regional benchmarks.

China has emerged as Pakistan's largest economic partner, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This partnership has facilitated substantial investment in energy, infrastructure, and connectivity projects. Between 2015 and 2023, CPEC accounted for nearly \$25 billion in investments, significantly upgrading Pakistan's road networks, power generation capacity, and the Gwadar port. Despite these advancements, the concentration of investments in a single partner has raised concerns about economic dependence, debt sustainability, and the lack of diversification in foreign investment sources.

In comparison, Pakistan's engagement with the United States has yielded varying economic results. During the Cold War and post-9/11 periods, US aid significantly supported Pakistan's defense and economy. For instance, between 2001 and 2010, the US provided over \$20 billion in military and economic aid as part of its counterterrorism efforts. However, this financial assistance was often tied to strategic priorities rather than long-term developmental goals, limiting its impact on sustainable growth. The shift in US policy post-2010, focusing on India as a strategic partner, further reduced Pakistan's access to American investments and trade opportunities.

When juxtaposed with regional players like India, the economic outcomes of Pakistan's diplomatic efforts highlight significant gaps. Pakistan's FDI inflows have averaged \$2–3 billion annually over the past decade, compared to India's \$60–80 billion during the same period. India's robust economic policies, political stability, and large consumer market have attracted diverse global investors, whereas Pakistan's investment climate has struggled due to political instability, security concerns, and inconsistent economic reforms. Similarly, Pakistan's GDP growth rate has averaged 3–4% in recent years, well below India's 6–7% and the global average of approximately 3.5%.

Moreover, structural challenges such as low industrial productivity, energy deficits, and insufficient technological advancement have constrained Pakistan's ability to compete globally. For example, Pakistan's share in global trade remains under 0.3%, whereas India accounts for over 2%. In terms of global competitiveness, Pakistan ranks below India in key indices such as the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business and the Global Competitiveness Report, underscoring the need for substantial reforms to attract international investors.

In summary, Pakistan's "diplomatic dance" has delivered critical infrastructure and strategic security benefits, particularly through its relationship with China. However, its limited success in achieving broader economic growth, FDI attraction, and global competitiveness compared to regional and global averages underscores the need for a more balanced and diversified economic strategy. Building stronger ties beyond its immediate allies, improving governance, and addressing internal inefficiencies will be crucial for Pakistan to leverage its strategic partnerships into sustained economic development.

8. Future Recommendations

In order to successfully traverse its intricate geopolitical terrain, Pakistan ought to take into account the following suggestions:

- 1. Leverage Hedging Strategy (US-China Balance):** Pakistan must use a hedging strategy in order to keep its relations with China and the US balanced. Pakistan can maintain its independence and lessen its susceptibility to outside influences by broadening its strategic alliances. Pakistan can preserve a precarious equilibrium between the US and

China and negotiate the challenges of great power competition with the aid of effective diplomacy.

- 2. Diversify Economic ties:** Pakistan should diversify its economic alliances in order to lessen its excessive reliance on China. Even if the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has a lot of economic potential, attracting foreign commerce and investment requires cooperation with other regional and international economic partners. Furthermore, boosting exports and investing in homegrown sectors will strengthen Pakistan's economy and lessen its vulnerability.
- 3. Make Democratic Institutions Stronger:** For foreign policy decisions to be made effectively, a democracy must be robust and stable. Maintaining human rights and the rule of law can improve Pakistan's standing abroad and draw in foreign investment. Fighting corruption is also essential to preserving public confidence and promoting economic development.
- 4. Strengthen Security Cooperation with Regional Partners:** Addressing security issues and advancing regional stability may be achieved by bolstering regional cooperation through collaboration on common objectives with allies such as Afghanistan, Iran, and India. Pakistan should keep up its fight against extremism and terrorism on a regional and national level. Addressing common security issues also requires strengthening counterterrorism collaboration with the US while keeping a balanced relationship with China.
- 5. Balance Great Power Competition:** Pakistan should avoid being too aligned with either China or the United States and instead work to maintain a balanced approach in its dealings with both countries. Pakistan may pursue its national interests and stay out of the

great power conflict by using strategic autonomy. Pakistan can protect its interests and shape the world agenda by engaging in international diplomacy. By giving careful thought to these suggestions, Pakistan would be able to safeguard its interests as a nation, negotiate its complicated geopolitical environment, and promote peace and stability in the region.

Bibliography

- Abdul Saboor, S. A. (2022). US-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY IN SOUTH ASIA: NEW CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN. *Pak. Journal of Int'L Affairs, Vol 5*.
- Ambreen Javaid, I. M. (2014). Historical Perspective of Pakistan USA Relations; Lessons. *South Asian Studies, 291-304*.
- Anwar, B. M. (2020). Relevance and Significance of Pak- China Relationship for USA in Changing Regional Dynamics. *Journal of Law & Social Studies (JLSS), 87-95*.
- Bhola, P. L. (1986). *Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Politico-Strategic Relationship*. Jaipur: R. B. S. A. Publishers.
- Boni, F. (2021). The US-China rivalry in South Asia and Pakistan's hedging dilemma. *Global Governance Programme, 1-3*.
- Butt, M. I. (2007). Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan and Domestic Concerns. *Advance Publishers* .

- Chaudhri, M. A. (1970). *Pakistan and the Great Powers*. Karachi: Mirror Press Ltd.
- Churchill, W. S. (1959). *The Second World War* .
- Darren Lim, Z. c. (2015). Reassessing hedging: the logic of alignment in East Asia. *Security Studies* .
- Dr. Adnan Nawaz, A. K. (2024). A Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Hedging Dilemma and China-US Rivalry in 21st Century. *Remittances Review*.
- EFSAS. (2017). *Pakistan's marriage with China – a divorce from the USA*. Amsterdam: European Foundation for South Asian Studies.
- Faisal, M. (2020). Pakistan-China Relations: Beyond CPEC. *Strategic Studies*.
- Goswami, N. (1971). *Pakistan and China: A Study of their Relation*. Bombay: Allied Publishers.
- Haacke, J. (2019). The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 19*.
- Haglund, D. G. (2009). Alliance. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.
- Hassan, Y. U. (2022). Navigating the Great-Power Competition: Pakistan and Its Relationship with the United States and China. *Asia policy, volume 17*.
- Hussain, M. (2016). Pak-US Relations: An Historical Overview. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XXXVII*.
- Iftikhar Ali, N. A. (2024). New Era of Pakistan's Embrace of China. Impact on Pakistan-U.S. Relations. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, 1-11*.

- Ilmas, A. K. (2023). A BRIEF HISTORY OF PAK-CHINA POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. *Central Asia Journal No. 92*.
- Iqtidar Hussain, I. H. (2020). HISTORY OF PAKISTAN–CHINA RELATIONS: THE COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY. *The Chinese Historical Review*.
- Jahangir, A. J. (2015). Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years. *Research Gate*.
- John D Ciorciari, J. H. (2019). Hedging in international relations: an introduction Get access Arrow. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 19*,.
- Johnston, A. I. (1999). .Engaging China: the management of an emerging power. *New York: Routledge*.
- Jr, J. M. (2004). Forging a coalition army: William III, the grand alliance, and the confederate army in the Spanish Netherlands, 1688-1697. *ohio link*.
- Kuik, C.-C. (2021). Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective. *China International Strategy Review*.
- Kux, D. (2001). *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lendering, J. (2017). *Peloponnesian League*. Retrieved from Livius.org:
<http://www.livius.org/articles/concept/peloponnesian-league/>
- Lou, C. (2012). US–India–China Relations in the Indian Ocean: A Chinese Perspective. *Strategic Analysis*.
- Marley, D. (1998). Wars of the Americas: a chronology of armed conflict in the New World, 1492 to present . *Abc-clio*.

Masahiro, K. (2023). South Asia under Great Power Rivalry. In *Great Power Rivalry and Regional Order*.

Mir, D. A. (2019, October 22). Authors interview with Dr. Asfandyar Mir Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University, USA. . (N. Arshad, Interviewer)

Monroe, E. (2014). *U.S.-China Relations: A Brief Historical Perspective* . U.S.-China Policy Foundation .

Muhammad Ghaffar, M. K. (2024). CPEC: A SOURCE OF STRENGTHENING BILATERAL TIES AND DRIVING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. *Pak. Journal of Int’L Affairs, Vol 7*.

Muhammad Hatim, Z. T. (2023). The Dynamics Of The Pakistan-U.S. Alliances. *Journal of Namibian Studies, 2489-2500*.

Nosherwan Adil, D. M.-e.-H. (2024). PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: HEDGING AGAINST US-CHINA-RUSSIA RIVALRIES POST 2013. *Pak. Journal of Int’L Affairs, Vol 7*.

Pant, H. V. (2012). The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–U.S. Relations. *The Washington Quarterly* .

Rizwan Naseer, M. A. (2011). Sino Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance against Common Threats. *Journal of Social Sciences*.

Roy Anthony Rogers, N. A. (2023). Understanding the Decline of Pakistan-US Alliance and the Growing Influence of China in Pakistan. *INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, 31:1* .

S Ali, A. M. (2018). Pakistan's China Policy: A Strategic Analysis. *Routledge*.

Sacks, D. (2021). 'Countries in China's Belt and Road Initiative: Who's In And Who's Out'.

Council on Foreign Relations.

Sardar, S. I. (2021). India: The Changing Security Environment,. *Focus* .

Sarwar Hassan, K. Q. (1999). *Documents on the Foreign Relations Pakistan — China, India and Pakistan*. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.

Sattar, A. (2011). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2009: A Concise History*. Oxford.

Sawhny, K. R. (1999). The Sino Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: Prospect & Retrospect. *Peace Initiatives*.

Seth Schindler, J. D. (2021). The new cold war and the rise of the 21st-century infrastructure state. *Transactions of the institute of British Geographers*.

Siddiqi, A. (2023, December). Old Wine in an Old Bottle: Pakistan and the US China Competition. *Special Report no 218: US China competition perspectives from South Asia*, pp. 6-11.

VAN, N. K. (2020). United States–Pakistan Relations in Post Cold War . *The Journal of Indian and Asian Studies*.

Appendix

Declaration of Originality

DECLARATION of originality


I, the undersigned Umes Borkan.....aware of my criminal responsibility,
I declare that the facts and figures contained in my dissertation correspond to reality and that
it describes the results of my own independent work.

The data used in the dissertation were applied taking into account the copyright protection.

No part of this dissertation has previously been used in other training at an educational
institution during graduation.

I accept that my dissertation is subject to plagiarism control by the institution.

Budapest, 20.24/11/30.....


student's signature