

# THESIS

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UNITED NATIONS' ARMS EMBARGO ON IRAN

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## **INTRODUCTION**

My thesis is about the UN arms embargo on Iran. The thesis also covers key aspects such as the historical units of Iran's nuclear program and the details of the sanctions imposed on the country, including the impact of the introduction of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the country, and the consequences of the lifting of the arms embargo imposed 15 years ago. My motivation was to choose a relevant topic, which today is still subject to constantly changing factors. It is a great challenge to demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge of a particular topic, substantiate it with reliable facts, and answer the questions that arise relating to the topic. Through the work invested, demonstrate that one can process the chosen problem, draw conclusions, and formulate results and opinions. This is why I have chosen the US arms embargo on Iran as my topic, a complex matter that requires thorough research and a considerable amount of background information.

Furthermore, the question arose in my mind which are the international issues and events that surround us today yet have little impact on us but have a more significant impact on those who are directly involved in them. Given that Iran is considered a country of considerable influence at the international level and a major regional player, the impact of a system of sanctions imposed collectively on the country by several countries raises important questions. The fact that some see Iran as a significant rival of one of the world's leading military powers (America) is also intriguing and was an even greater influence on my choice of topic.

I will also discuss quantifiable results and statistics supported by measured data in my thesis. These data will answer the questions that arise in my chosen topic, such as: what were the antecedents of the sanctions imposed on the country, what exactly are the sanctions that have hit Iran, what will be the international consequences of the lifting of the sanctions, and what are the country's objectives after the lifting of the embargo?

In my research, I sought to answer the question of the reasons behind the arms embargo imposed by the UN. How has the embargo shaped Iran's nuclear program throughout history? How have the sanctions imposed on Iran shaped the development of its economy and its relations with the rest of the world? My thesis, based on secondary sources, publications, internet portals, and the information gathered from them, aims to produce a comprehensive and detailed work on the United Nations sanctions, the arms embargo, and the possible consequences of lifting it.

# 1. THE UNITED NATIONS

## 1.2 Brief introduction to the United Nations (UN)

In order to get an overview of the issues to be addressed in the thesis, it is first necessary to examine the topic in its elements. The first element of the thesis is the United Nations. The name "United Nations" comes from US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. ( history.com, n.a ) The term was first used in the Washington Declaration (Declaration of the United Nations), signed on 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1942 by the nations of the anti-fascist cooperation, when these governments pledged to work together to win the war against "Hitlerism"<sup>1</sup>.

A conference of 50 countries was held in San Francisco from 25 to 26 April 1945 to draw up the primary documents of the new international organization. The Statute of the Organisation, otherwise known as the United Nations Charter, and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was signed by six countries and those participating in the conference. (un.org, n.a.)

The Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945 (un.org, n.a.), after ratification by the United States, France, China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union (five permanent representatives in the SC), and most of the participating Member States. Since then, 24 October has been celebrated worldwide as UN Day. States have joined the UN through a specific procedure for admission. The Organisation currently has 193 members. ( un.org, 2022)

The UN's objectives are set out in Article 1 of the Charter. These are: the preservation of international peace and security; the cultivation of friendly relations among nations; cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; respecting the freedom of humans and the rights of them; and coordination of the activities of nations in the attainment of these objectives. (un.org, n.a.)

Article 2 of the Charter lays down the basic principles on which the Organisation operates. These include the sovereign equality of Member States; the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken under the Charter in good faith; the resolution of international disputes by peaceful means; the preservation of the territorial integrity besides political independence of States; the refraining from the threat or use of force; and the support of the UN in all its activities following

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<sup>1</sup> „Hitlerism or in other words Nazism refers to the practices, doctrines, and principles favoured and developed by Adolf Hitler, who’s ideas gave base to Nazism.” <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hitlerism> 2022. 03. 18.

the Charter. The UN shall not intervene in matters which fall within the domestic jurisdiction of States. (un.org, n.a.)

### **1.2.1 Main bodies of the UN**

Under the Charter, the organisation has six main bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat.(un.org, n.a.) The official languages of the Organization are English, French, Arabic, Russian, Spanish and Chinese. The working languages of the Secretariat are English and French. (un.org, n.a.)

### **1.2.2 The General Assembly (GA)**

Each and every UN member states are members of the General Assembly, each with one vote. The General Assembly's decisions are recommendations, and no member state can be bound to implement them.

The General Assembly may discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter. It can make recommendations to the Member States or the Security Council, except when the same issue is on the agenda of the Security Council. In the same way, it may include any question proposed by a Member State or by the Security Council on its agenda. The General Assembly may make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including situations that threaten friendly relations between states. Also, it may draw the attention of the Security Council to situations that may endanger international peace and security. (britannica.com, n.a.)

The General Assembly's roles include

- discussing reports from UN bodies,
- electing the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council, and
- electing members of the Economic and Social Council and other bodies.

The General Assembly decides on the admission of new member states and the appointment of the UN Secretary-General based on a recommendation from the Security Council. The General Assembly and the SC elect the International Court of Justice members by separate votes. The General Assembly approves the budget of the Organisation and the distribution of compulsory contributions (scale of assessments). (un.org, n.a.)

Decisions of the Assembly on so-called important matters require a two-thirds majority. For all other matters, a simple majority of the votes of the member states present and voting is sufficient. (un.org, n.a.)

The Assembly holds one regular session per year, starting on the third Tuesday in September and lasting until mid-December.(un.org, n.a.) In recent years, the regular session is not being formally closed to allow the session in question to continue the following year. An extraordinary session can be scheduled at the initiative of the SC, a majority of member states, or any member state if a majority agrees. An extraordinary urgent session shall be convened within 24 hours based on a decision of the SC or a request by a majority of the Member States. (un.org, n.a.)

The Assembly shall act in accordance with its own rules of procedure. At each session, it elects the President, the 21 Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees. (un.org, n.a.) The General Assembly decides which items on the agenda are discussed by which main committees. The Main Committees discuss these and adopt recommendations to the Assembly on specific items on the agenda.

The main committees deal with decommissioning and security issues, policy issues, economics and financials, human rights problems, decolonisation issues, budget and administration issues, and legal affairs.

The General Committee, consisting of the President, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the Main Committees, deals with organizational matters of the Assembly. The Credentials Committee examines the credentials of the delegations of the Member States. (un.org, n.a.)

### **1.2.3 The Trusteeship Council**

Under the terms of the Charter, the Trusteeship Council was responsible for supervising areas without a municipality. With the independence of the colonial territories, the Trusteeship Council has effectively lost its functions; of the 11 territories placed initially under its supervision, every territory gained independence. As a result, the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on 1 November 1994, one month after Palau's last remaining enclave became independent. As a result of a decision adopted on 25 May of the same year, the Council changed its rules of procedure and ceased to meet annually. Nevertheless, it decided, by



agreement, to meet when the need arises, either based on the Security Council or the General Assembly or its President or the will of a majority of its members. (un.org, n.a.)

#### **1.2.4 The International Court of Justice**

The International Court of Justice, based in Netherland in The Hague, is the highest-ranking judicial organ of the UN. (un.org, n.a.) Its powers and functions are outlined in its Statute, which is an integral part of the Charter. The Member States of the United Nations became parties to the charter of the ICJ when they adopted the Charter of the Organisation. On the recommendation of the Security Council and with the consent of the UN GA, non-member States can become parties as well to the Statute of the International Court of Justice: Switzerland (1948), Liechtenstein (1950), and San Marino (1954) are members of the Charter.

All cases referred to the ICJ by States Parties are subject to its jurisdiction, particularly those specifically stated in the Charter of the UN or regulated by international treaties or arrangements in force. Where the jurisdiction of the Court is in dispute, the Court itself shall decide. The International Court of Justice does not deal with cases involving individuals.

A State Party to the Convention may proclaim at any moment that it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in respect of any dispute concerning international treaties' interpretation, questions regarding international law or facts, that if proven true, could be listed as disregarding the international law or even the reparations themselves, if the mentioned breach happens. (oas.org, 2022)

The GA and UNSC may request the Court's consultative judgement on any inquiry of law. Other UN organs or specialized agencies can as well request its point of view if authorized by the General Assembly. The Court, which is responsible under international law for deciding on disputes brought before it, uses the following sources in its proceedings: common or exceptional international protocols which lay down regulations of law unmistakably recognized by the States' parties to the dispute; as proof of common practice, global custom is recognized as regulations.; civilized nations have agreed on a set of general legal concepts.; as assistance to the formation of legislation, judicial rulings and the precepts of the world's most prominent publicists. (icj-cij.org, 2022)

The Court is composed of 15 independent judges of different nationalities, elected by separate ballot by the General Assembly and the SC for nine years. (un.org, n.a.)

Since its establishment, the ICJ has delivered around 150 judgments and given advisory opinions in 182 cases. The vast majority of disputes between states concerned territorial sovereignty, territorial waters, continental shelf boundaries, fishing rights, and territorial sovereignty. (icj-cij.org, 2022)

### **1.2.5 The Secretariat**

The UN Secretariat, the guard of international civil servants, ensures the smooth running and continuity of the organization. It attends meetings of the committees of the UN organs, ensures their proper preparation, facilitates the implementation of decisions and resolutions, and directs the implementation of programs. The UN Secretary-General heads it.

The General Assembly appoints the S-G of the UN, on the recommendation of the Security Council, for a term of 5 years. In addition to directing the Secretariat, the Secretary-General has a very important political function under the Charter: he may propose to the Security Council any matter he considers may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. (un.org, n.a.)

Today the Secretary-General is António Guterres since 2017

The staff of the Secretariat consist of nationals of 145 countries. They can only take instructions from the organisation and must operate independently of their countries and governments.

Almost 36 574 professionals and staff work in the secretariats of the UN and its affiliated agencies and in the aid programmes in each country, including experts from United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF. Additionally to the New York headquarters, there are secretariats in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, Santiago de Chile, Baghdad and Bangkok. There are UN information offices in more than 100 countries.(ask.un.org, 2022)

### **1.2.6 The Security Council (SC)**

The Security Council comprises five permanent (United Kingdom, France, China, United States of America, Soviet Union) along with ten non-permanent member states. The General Assembly elects the non-permanent members for a two-year, non-renewable term.

The Security Council is also the one and only UN body that, under the Charter, that may determine resolutions that are irrevocable on the Members. The Security Council may examine any dispute or tense situation and make proposals for its settlement or resolution. It may make recommendations for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. It can take coercive measures against a state that threatens peace and security, including economic sanctions or other measures. If these measures prove insufficient, it may decide to use armed force.

The Security Council has a single vote for each member. Procedural decisions require nine votes. Decisions on substantive matters also require nine votes, but these decisions are only valid if five permanent members of the BTWC support them. A negative vote (the so-called veto) by any Permanent Member may prevent adopting a non-business decision.

### **1.2.7 The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)**

The Council makes recommendations and initiates action on issues of international economic cooperation, international trade, industrialization, natural resources, human rights, the status of women, population, education, health, science and technology, crime prevention, drug control, and other economic and social cooperation.(britannica.com, n.a.)

ECOSOC has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for a 3-year term. Each member has one vote, and decisions are taken by a simple majority. (un.org, n.a.)

The Economic and Social Council meets twice a year. The spring session, held in New York, is usually devoted to human rights, humanitarian and social issues, while the summer session in Geneva deals with international economic cooperation issues. (guide-humanitarian-law.org, 2022)

The experts participating in ECOSOC's expert committees do not represent their governments but participate in their individual capacities. The Expert Committees are: the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control; the Committee on Economic Planning; the Committee of Public Administration Experts; and the Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.

ECOSOC also includes the so-called UN Regional Economic Commissions. The Economic and Social Council is also in charge of coordinating the operations of the so-called affiliated bodies within the UN, which operate with some autonomy.

The fundamental difference between these so-called affiliated bodies and the specialized agencies is that while the former does not have a separate membership and is funded by the UN regular budget and voluntary contributions, the latter is legally and organisationally autonomous, has a separate budget, and are governed by a separate cooperation agreement.

The economic and social activities of the specialized agencies and other UN bodies - collectively known as the UN family - are guided, monitored, and harmonized by the Economic and Social Council. It was created in recognition of the fact that in today's world political situation, no international cooperation can be envisaged without a thorough consideration of economic and social problems and the protection of all people's human rights and basic liberties.

The Economic and Social Council originally had 18 members. The 1965 amendment to the Statute increased the number of members to 27 and the 1973 amendment to 54. The membership's tripling resulted from pressure from developing countries and reflects the considerable change in the number of UN members following the break-up of the colonial system and the emergence of newly independent states. Each member of the Council gets a single vote. Decisions are taken by a majority of the members' votes present and voting.

The Council holds two regular sessions a year: one in the spring in New York and one during the summer held in Geneva. The summer conference is often continued in New York in the autumn during the UN General Assembly. The established division of labor is that social issues are discussed in the spring session and economic issues in the summer.

The subordinate bodies of the Council are divided into six main categories: 1. Functional commissions; 2. Regional Commissions; 3. Standing committee; 5. Expert body (governmental experts); 6. Expert body (personal capacity). (un.org, n.a.)

The Standing Committees perform various specialized tasks as decided by the Council. Their number has proliferated over the last two decades, partly because of the new tasks they are taking on and partly because of pressure from the developing countries, which, until they can achieve a fundamental transformation of the UN, are seeking to increase their influence through these committees. The standing committees currently in operation are the Programme and Coordination Committee (CPC), and the Non-Governmental Organizations Committee. (un.org, n.a.)

The Economic and Social Council's years of activity are so varied that even the central programs can only be mentioned in passing. Between 1945 and 1955, when the United Nations

was made up predominantly of industrialized countries, the primary objectives were to repair war damage and financial order, combat unemployment and inflation, improve transport, and ensure the continued supply of primary and raw materials. The mass influx of developing countries into the organization created a radically different situation. The rudimentary issue was no longer to promote the existing economic structure's best functioning but to gradually close the gap between the living standards of developed and developing countries, which was a legacy of colonial oppression and the extreme economic backwardness of the developing countries. Thus, the first UN Decade for Development was launched in 1961, the second in 1970, and the third in 1980, and the various World Conferences on Development (food, industry, human settlements, water, village development, technology transfer) were organized in parallel with the objectives of the new international economic order. The role of the subordinate committees has been enhanced by the creation of various funds or institutes (the UN Population Fund, the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, the UN Foundation for Housing and Human Settlements). In addition to the outstanding achievements of the Commission on Human Rights concerning General Assembly resolutions already mentioned, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs was a significant success in drafting the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. (britannica.com, n.a.)

### **1.3 International Atomic Energy Agency**

The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organization within the United Nations family of specialized agencies, established in 1957 and currently made up of 173 member states. Its main decision-making body is the General Conference of the Member States, which meets annually. Its operational governing body is the Board of Governors (BoG), which meets five times a year and is composed of 35 Member States. (iaea.org, 2022)

As the executive arm of the organization, the Secretariat, led by the Director-General, puts into practice the decisions and other decisions of the policy-making bodies. The IAEA has an annual budget of around USD 370 million, supplemented by Technical Co-operation funding, usually over and above a budget of nearly USD 85,7 million. The IAEA's Secretariat in Vienna and its four regional offices employ some 2,300 people. The current Director-General, General Rafael Mariano Grossi, took over the IAEA in 2019. (iaea.org, 2022)

The IAEA's activities are essentially structured around three broad, interrelated, and internally balanced pillars:

- promoting and supporting the non-violent uses of nuclear energy and other relating technologies
- strengthening nuclear security
- verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear activities through the safeguards system

Maintaining a balance between these three areas is of continuing importance, particularly for developing countries.

Generally speaking, its tasks range from promoting the amicable use of nuclear energy to helping the Member States acquire the necessary knowledge and prevent it from being used for military purposes. The organization assists with scientific research and the application of research results. It mediates between the Member States in transferring nuclear materials, equipment, and related services. To this end, it organizes meetings, seminars, and conferences for scientists and other professionals. The Agency aims to develop nuclear energy and promote the use of isotopes in medicine, agriculture, and industry. It advises governments on developing their nuclear energy programs and provides equipment and facilities. Develops standards for the protection of nuclear materials. (iaea.org, 2022)

The Agency monitors compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) through the safeguards system, accounting for the production, transport, and use of nuclear fissile material. The safeguards system is implemented by inspectors who also verify the data submitted by governments on the ground at nuclear facilities. Around 900 such facilities worldwide have been placed under the Agency's safeguards system. (iaea.org, 2022)

In recent years, the prevention of nuclear accidents has come to the fore as a consequence of Chernobyl, with the come into effect of the “International Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” in 1986 and the “International Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident” in 1987. Both conventions were developed within the Agency. (iaea.org, 2022)

As mentioned before, the IAEA helps encourage the harmless uses of nuclear energy, mainly through its technical cooperation and assistance program and by developing legal recommendations, technical information, technical support and safety recommendations. The IAEA's technical cooperation and assistance fund, which amounts to some USD 87 million per year, supports significant projects in the Member States to nurture the harmless uses of nuclear energy. In addition to energy production, its activities in this area cover medical applications,

food preservation, breeding of agricultural crops, and desalination of seawater, anti-personnel mine detection, and so forth. The IAEA's activities in this area also aim to strengthen the functionality of nuclear sciences and technologies in imperishable development. (iaea.org, 2022)

Of particular importance is the development of legal and technical standards and recommendations for the depiction, construction, functioning, life extension, and shut down of atomic energy power plants and disposal of nuclear waste produced in nuclear applications, which are generally applied by countries around the world as minimum requirements for internal legal and technical regulation in the relevant fields. (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2000) In its activities, the IAEA is nowadays working on the assumption that keeping the option of nuclear power generation open is an inevitable necessity for an as yet unforeseeable period and that the use of nuclear energy makes a significant contribution to the social and economic development of the Member States. The 450 nuclear power plants currently operating in 20 countries account for around 10% of the world's electricity generation. (world-nuclear.org, 2022) With the recent rapid increase in world oil prices and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, which has tightened emission standards, the demand for nuclear energy is expected to grow at a slower pace, despite the Fukushima accident. (Bychkov, 2013)

#### **1.4 Non-proliferation and the IAEA safeguards system**

The IAEA operates an apparatus of safeguards to corroborate acquiescence with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It provides international assurances that the utilization of nuclear fissile material and the activities of nuclear facilities are for peaceful purposes only (full safeguards) in all declared nuclear facilities in the regions of non-nuclear-weapon factions to the NPT, through a national reporting system and complemented by regular on-site inspections. In the case of nuclear-weapon countries and non-NPT states parties, IAEA verification activities are not comprehensive and cover only part of the nuclear facilities. (IAEA Department of Safeguards, 2021)

In the early 1990s, the detection of nuclear programs in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which had been concealed from international IAEA verification, triggered a process of strengthening the safeguards system, which led to the establishment of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997. The IAEA inspections under the full “Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement”, in addition to the verification methods used so far, provide IAEA experts with a more robust verification capability than before through the usage

of effective new techniques, the collection and analysis of environmental samples, and on-site inspections announced at short notice. In September 2005, on the initiative of the Director-General, the BoG strengthened the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), a significant step towards addressing weaknesses in the safeguards system. In support of safeguards inspections, the Secretariat has, over the past two years, begun to map illicit nuclear trafficking networks, in particular, the nuclear weapons program of the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, who has since been dismantled. ( IAEA Department of Safeguards, 2007)

The global nuclear non-proliferation system faced unprecedented challenges at the turn of the millennium. The erosion of trust in the non-violent nature of the nuclear programs in North Korea, Libya, and Iran, and even the occasional revelation of weaponization, has led to the IAEA being given increasingly large and complex verification tasks. Its activities have become increasingly political, and its role in maintaining international peace and security has received particular attention. At its June 2011 session, the IAEA BoG adopted its first condemnation resolution on Syria. (IAEA Board of Governors, 2011)

The Director-General has taken personal initiatives to meet the challenges of the changing security environment. In his speeches, he highlighted the proliferation risks correlated with the broader use of certain nuclear technologies, particularly uranium enrichment. He has taken the initiative to relocate the prone characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle from the national to the international level, with the IAEA serving as a guarantor of nuclear fuel supply. Director General Amano's priorities include promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the fields of cancer research and water management and purification. (iaea.org, 2015)

### **The fight against nuclear terrorism**

Supporting Member States' efforts to fight nuclear terrorism has emerged as a new priority for the IAEA in the aftermath of the terrorist events on September 11, 2001. While nuclear security remains essentially a national responsibility, the IAEA has developed a global program of action by integrating its traditional areas of activity in this field, including nuclear facility security. The Secretariat successfully implemented the first Action Programme against Nuclear Terrorism between 2002 and 2005. This is the basis for the second Action Programme 2006-2009, adopted by the BoG in September 2005. Recent progress has also been made in strengthening the international permissible substructure for the fight against nuclear terrorism. The IAEA hosted a Diplomatic Conference in July 2005 that dramatically expanded the scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to include the



protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material utilized, stored, and transported. ( [iaea.org](http://iaea.org), 2022)

In April 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a new International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was opened for signature on 14 September 2005. ([legal.un.org](http://legal.un.org), 2005)

In 2008, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) was established, with participants committing to develop their capabilities to counter nuclear terrorism. The initiative aims to prevent a potential nuclear terrorist attack. ([nti.org](http://nti.org), 2020)

The Nuclear Security Summit was first held in Washington in April 2010. The Summit, initiated by President Obama, focused on major global issues such as preventing nuclear terrorism and ensuring the proper protection of nuclear fissile material and its peaceful uses under the international nuclear security regime. (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2016)

The second Nuclear Security Summit will take place on 26-27 March 2012 in Seoul, where the issue of nuclear safety and security, and the highly questioned safety of the nuclear industry, will be further highlighted in the light of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. ([armscontrol.org](http://armscontrol.org), 2018)

## **1.5 United Nations instruments of power**

The United Nations is also the most significant actor in security policy. Its influence on the international scene often promotes cooperation between international organizations. The objectives of cooperation between international organizations often include the prevention, prevention, and resolution of conflicts, the establishment of general peace, the promotion of democracy, the preservation of human righteousness, the fight against terrorism, and the resolution of emerging international and regional problems.

### **Possible Security Council measures**

The main objective of the UN Charter is to promote international peace and security, for which the Security Council has the primary responsibility. It forbids all countries from using or threatening to use force. It gives the UN a monopoly on the use of force except in self-defense, to use it for the maintenance of international peace and security. The first step is to define the situation, i.e., decide whether the Security Council should act under Chapter VI or VII of the

Charter. It can then decide whether to apply provisional arrangements, recommendations, or binding measures. (un.org, n.a.)

### **Main differences between Chapters VI and VII**

The two Chapters of the Statute show significant differences both in the scope of application and in the measures that can be applied. Chapter VI applies when the prolongation of an international conflict could lead to a threat to peace, but this may not be the case. In comparison, Chapter VII can be applied if a threatening remark to the peace, a violation of the law, or an deed of hostility occurs, i.e., in situations where there is a tangible threat to international peace and security or where it is already threatened or needs to be restored. Where Chapter six applies, the Council might attempt to settle the dispute peacefully. However, such attempts must not go beyond the recommendations, unlike in situations under Chapter VII, where coercive measures, including, in the last resort, armed measures, may be taken. Decisions adopted under Chapter VI are recommendations and are not legally binding. By contrast, the adoption of binding decisions is already possible under Chapter VII. An essential procedural difference is that under Chapter VI, the State concerned is obliged to abstain from voting, whereas under Chapter VII it is not. UN sanctions and the actors involved. (un.org, 2022)

### **Possible measures under Chapter VII**

As we have seen above, one of the most important powers of the Security Council is the right to determine the situation, which it alone has. This is a decision on the substance, which means that the permanent members have the right to veto. Article 39 of the Statute defines the decision-making status as follows. Based on established practice, the Council exercises broad discretion in determining the situation, having identified a wide range of situations over the past decades as triggering the applicability of Chapter VII. Of the three categories referred to in Article 39, threats to peace encompass the most significant number of possible acts. The first time the Security Council applied this qualification was in 1948, when the Arab states launched an attack against the State of Israel, which had declared its creation. Subsequently, it has been applied to many other cases that did not constitute an international conflict, including humanitarian crises involving serious and mass violations of human rights: situations of violence within a state, refugee crises, and the phenomenon of international terrorism. A breach of peace refers to a situation where armed hostilities between states arise due to some kind of state action. Experience so far shows that state action is needed to counter threats to peace, which non-state actors can also trigger. So far, the Council established a breach of the peace in

1950 with the Korean War, in 1982 with the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, during the Iraq-Iran war, and in 1990 in the case of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Concerning the determination of an act of aggression (which has been made on a limited number of occasions), the exact content of the term has been an open question, given that neither Article 39 nor the Charter itself contains a definition of such acts, which has led to a long period of controversy over the exact meaning of the term. This situation was helped by the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of acts of aggression in 1974, which defined the concept of acts of aggression in an exemplary manner, adding that the Security Council itself could define acts of aggression as such acts as such. (un.org, 2022)

### **Imposition of coercive measures**

If the Council has decided that Chapter VII applies, it may decide to impose specific coercive measures. Articles 41 and 42 of the Statute define the two main categories of measures that may be taken, namely those that do not involve armed force and those that do. Under Article 41, the Council may, for example, order the severance of economic or diplomatic relations, an embargo, the total or partial suspension of a State's means of communication with the rest of the world, or the suspension of a State's relations with the rest of the world, or any measure which it considers appropriate for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. The Council may, based on Article 42, order coercive measures involving the use of armed force, including the use of armed forces, which may be either the Central Powers placed at the disposal of the United Nations or units of individual Member States. (un.org, 2022)

### **Types of UN sanctions:**

- arms embargoes (on the export, transit, and transfer of military equipment and technology, import or provision of related services;
- prohibition of other commercial services (e.g., dual-use goods of the export, transit, import of dual-use goods and services of the export, transit, import or provision of related services, prohibition of timber, diamonds, goods for internal repression, and so forth);
- asset-restriction measures (prohibitions on the export of funds and other economic resources freezing and making available);
- prohibitions on the import, export, transfer or export of arms, munitions and related materiel the provision of financial assistance for the provision of related services, financing;
- entry and residence bans;
- other restrictive measures (such as flight bans).

These sanctions are also applied by other actors (countries, organizations). For example, the EU can reinforce UN sanctions by taking additional measures to those imposed by the UNSC.

## **1. INTRODUCTION TO IRAN**

### **1.1 Geographical overview of the country**

Iran lies in the western part of the Asian continent and has the second-largest territory among the so-called Middle Eastern countries. It covers an area of 1,648,195 square kilometers, including 1,531,595 square kilometers of land and 116,600 square kilometers of water. (cia.gov, 2022)


If we look at its neighbours clockwise, we can observe that it is bordered in the north by Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Turkmenistan. It borders Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east and the south, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. In the east, it borders Turkey and Iraq. Iran's border is 5,894 kilometers long, and it shares this distance with seven countries.



1. Figure Map of Iran

Source: [https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/iran\\_map.htm](https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/iran_map.htm) Downloaded: 2022.04.25.

Despite the country's vastness, the climate is generally uniform, with four distinct seasons. The average temperature in the hottest summer months ranges from 25-32°C, however, because of the low humidity, the heat throughout the day is more manageable. Snow is common in winter, persisting in the higher altitudes until March-April. Most of the 100-400 mm of precipitation (about 70 percent) falls between November and May, while from June to October, almost no rain falls. Two regions have climates that differ significantly from those described above: the Caspian Sea region has high year-round rainfall, making summers muggy, and the Persian Gulf region, especially in the northwest, in the summer, it is among the hottest locations on the planet. Temperatures of 45-50°C are often recorded in the shade, and high humidity makes the heat even more unbearable. (watheronline.co.uk, 2022)



2. Figure Topographic map of Iran

Source: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Topographic-map-of-Iran-shows-various-physiographic-regions-source-wwwworldofmapsnet\\_fig1\\_277020426](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Topographic-map-of-Iran-shows-various-physiographic-regions-source-wwwworldofmapsnet_fig1_277020426) Downloaded: 2022.04.25.


Geographically, Iran's territory is made up of mountainous margins surrounded by high inland basins. The most extensive mountain range that divides the country from northwest to south-east is called the Zagros Mountains, a chain of several parallel ridges intermixed with plains. The Zagros Mountains are typically characterized by peaks over 3,000 meters above sea level, but in the south-central part of the country, there are more than five peaks reaching heights of 4,000 meters or more. Following the line of the Zagros Mountains towards the south-east of Iran, the peaks are observed to fall below 1500 meters.

The other prominent mountain range in Iran is the narrow but high Alborz Mountains, which extend along the Caspian Sea coast and form a kind of border along the country's frontier. The volcanic mountain that peaks in the middle of the Alborz range is Mount Damavand.

Damavand is not only the highest point in the country (5,600 meters) but also the highest mountain on the Eurasian mainland west of the Hindu Kush (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)

The central region of the country, known as the Central Plateau, is made up of several enclosed basins. In this Central Plateau, the altitude is typically around 900 meters above sea level, but many of the mountains surrounding the plateau have peaks of over 3,000 meters. In addition, two salt deserts, Dasht-e Lut and the Dasht-e Kavir are located in the eastern part of the Central Plateau. These salt deserts are uninhabited and have nothing to offer except for a few scattered oases. (britannica.com, 2022)

Iran also has two lowlands. The Caspian Sea coastal plain is to the north, and to the southwest is the so-called Khuzestan plain. The Khuzestan Plain has an average width of 160 kilometers and is a kind of triangular extension of the Mesopotamian Plain. It merely climbs a few meters above sea level and extends inland for about 120 kilometers before abruptly colliding with the smaller foothills of the Zagros Mountains. It is also noticeable that marshes cover a large area of the Khuzestan Plain. In contrast, the Caspian plain is much narrower and more prolonged. It stretches for 640 kilometers along the Caspian coast, yet it is just 50 kilometers wide at its widest point, as well as the distance between the shore and the Alborz foothills is less than 2 kilometers in some places. Since the Zagros Mountains extend all the way to the shore of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, there are no true plains in the areas south of Khuzestan. (britannica.com, 2022)



3. Figure Iran climate zones

Source: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Climate-zones-of-Iran67\\_fig90\\_320264423](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Climate-zones-of-Iran67_fig90_320264423)

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Iran does not have large rivers of significant importance. As a matter of fact, the only river that can be navigated by boat is the Karun. It is the only one of Iran's rivers and streams that can be navigated by shallow-draft boats. However, this navigable stretch of water also has a limited length. It covers a distance of approximately 180 kilometers between Ahvaz and Khorramshahr. The direction of flow of the many other smaller rivers is determined by the mountains from which they originate. The rivers and streams from the Zagros Mountains flow into the Persian Gulf and become one with the Arabian Sea, while the streams and rivers of the Alborz Mountains flow into the Caspian Sea. The Central Plateau already mentioned has several rivers, many of which are dry-bedded throughout the year, formed by snow melting during the spring and flowing through channels, draining into salt lakes, which dry up with the summer




warming. In terms of water surfaces, rivers are exhausted above, and no other significant rivers can be mentioned, but Iran has lakes that deserve mention in this paragraph. We can find a permanent salt lake in the north of Iran called Lake Urmia. The salinity of the lake is too high to support aquatic life, fish, and plants, and therefore the lake is empty of wildlife. On the country's border with Afghanistan, the province of Baluchestan and Sistan is home to several contiguous saltwater lakes. (water.fanack.com, 2022)

## **1.2 Population of Iran**

Iran's population of 85,888,910 is ethnically diverse. It ranks 17th in the world in terms of population. According to some sources, eight different ethnic groups make up the population of Iran. These eight ethnic groups are Persian, Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen, and Turkic tribes.

The country's society is a friendly and ethnically and culturally diverse population. The leading cultural and ethnic group in Iranian society is the Persian-speaking population, which is the majority. It is observed, however, that the people generally described as Persian have a varying composition in terms of their origin, and the country's minorities, such as Baluchis, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtyārīs Jews, Assyrians, Brahus, in addition to a significant amount of Arab and Turkish people. The speakers of Kurdish, Persian, and other Indo-European languages of present-day Iran are descendants of tribes that migrated from Central Asia to present-day Iran in the second millennium BC. The descendants of the Turkic tribes, who also migrated from Central Asia in the 11th century AD, make up the Turkic population of present-day Iran. As for the Arab minority, the tribes that settled in the south-west of the country in the Arabistan and Khūzestān regions following the Islamic conquests in the 7th century are referred to as the ancestors of today's Islamic minority. Overall, therefore, it can be observed that the ancestors of the majority of the tribes that make up the population of Iran arrived in the region in ancient times. (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)



4. Figure Ethnicities in Iran

Source: [https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnic\\_Map\\_of\\_Iran.png](https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnic_Map_of_Iran.png) Downloaded: 2022.04.25.

The country's population is made up of ethnically and culturally diverse groups who are friendly in their relations. The main cultural and ethnic group in Iranian society is the Persian-speaking population, which is in the majority. It is observed, however, that the people generally described as Persian have a varying composition in terms of their origin, such as the country's minorities, Baluchis, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtyārīs Jews, Assyrians, Brahus, in addition to a significant amount of Arab and Turkish people. The speakers of Kurdish, Persian and other Indo-European languages of present-day Iran are descendants of tribes that migrated from Central Asia to Iran in the second millennium BC. The descendants of the Turkish tribes, who also migrated from Central Asia in the 11th century AD, make up the Turkish population of present-day Iran. As for the Arab minority, the tribes that settled in the south-west of the country in the Arabistan and Khūzestān regions following the Islamic conquests in the 7th century are referred to as the ancestors of today's Islamic minority. Overall, therefore, it can be observed that the ancestors of the majority of the tribes that make up the population of Iran arrived in the region in ancient times. (britannica.com, 2022)

The Kurds are concentrated in the western mountainous regions of Iran. Their way of life can be divided into urban and rural Kurds, with a significant majority of the latter living a nomadic lifestyle from time to time. On the whole, the Kurdish ethnic group makes up only a tiny proportion of Iran's population. They have a history of resisting government efforts to

'acclimatize' them before and after the 1979 revolution. This group has expressed resistance to efforts to assimilate them into the mainstream of Iranian national life. So much so that it has sought to form an independent state through the joint efforts of the Kurdish regions of the country and the Kurdish regions of neighbouring countries such as Turkey over the years. (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)

Like the Kurds, the country's western highlands are also inhabited by semi-nomadic Lurs, who are counted as descendants of the country's indigenous people. The Lurs are closely related to the Bakhtyārī tribes. These tribes live in the Zagros Mountains west of Eṣfahān. The Iranian area bordering Pakistan, called Baluchistan, is inhabited by the Baloch, who form a small ethnic group. (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)

The largest Turkic population segment in Iran comprises Azerbaijanis, who are engaged in farming and herding in Iran's northwestern border provinces. There are also two other ethnic Turkish groups in the country. The Qashqā'ī ethnic group lives in the Shīrāz area north of the Persian Gulf, and the Turkmen ethnic group is known as the Khorāsān in the northeast. (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)

The regions of Azerbaijan, Tehran, and Eṣfahān are home to Armenians with different ethnic heritages. Centered on and around the Eṣfahān province, in the city of Fereydūnshahr, a community of Georgians. Also scattered in the southeastern Sīstān region are Dravidian dialect-speaking groups who are few in number and living in isolation.

Overall, Assyrians, Semites-Jews, and Arabs make up a small percentage of the population. The Jews, like the Armenians, have retained their linguistic, ethnic, and religious identity, which can be traced back to the Babylonian exile in the 6th century BC. Both communities were initially concentrated in the larger cities. The Arabs live on the Persian Gulf islands and in Khūzestān, while the Assyrians live in the north-western areas.

About a quarter of Iran's population (around 24.70%) is under 15 years old. Iran's slightly higher growth rate than the world average is due to its lower birth and death rates than the world average. Also, Iran's post-revolutionary birth surge has decreased significantly. Iran's life expectancy is 76 years for women and 73 years for men. (cia.gov, 2022)

As a result of internal migration, there has been a trend in Iran since the 1960s for people to migrate from rural regions to cities. However, after the 1979 revolution, a significant demographic phenomenon spread, with the result that a considerable part of Iran's secularised

population and educated class migrated to Western countries, mainly to the United States. Likewise, the vast majority of religious minorities (mainly Bahā'īs and Jews) who left the country (either as asylum seekers or emigrants) justified their departure by unfavourable political circumstances, which can be considered as having left the country. After that, the aforementioned internal migration continued, and large numbers of mainly Persian (Dari) speaking Afghans from Iran's neighbouring countries, such as its western neighbour Afghanistan, were admitted as refugees. As well as Arab and Kurdish refugees from Iraq. (Curtis, G. E., Hooglund, E. J. & Library Of Congress, 2008)

### **1.3 Economy**

Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution introduced and implemented an experimental political establishment model based on the principle of the so-called Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), rooted in Shī'a Islam aimed at attracting the attention of the entire Islamic world. The translation into practice of the theory of Islamic governance developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the second half of the 1960s (also) marked the encounter between the totalitarian conception of Islam (and its particular Shiite interpretation) and the practice of governance, the administration of the state, which is also a decisive factor in the management of the economy, among other things.

In the practice of the he Velayat-e Faqih, this means that the Supreme Leader (until his death in 1989, Khomeini, then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) interprets the divine laws on the economy, for example, he sets the main directions - while implementation is the task of the president, who is now heading the state administration and the state apparatus, currently Ebrahim Raisi. At the same time, the Velayat-e Faqih system includes several actors that are not involved in the management and operation of the state or not in a fully transparent manner. In other countries, these usually include private sector representatives and transnational corporations, while in the Islamic Republic, certain institutions of Shi'ite religious circles may typically be dominant. (Sadjadpour, 2010)


Accordingly, Iran's economic system is determined by: Islam and its Shi'ite conception; revolutionary and leftist influences; the country's geo-geopolitical characteristics; and the international environment in which its economic interests must (or can) be pursued.

Iran has significant service sectors in agriculture and industry, but its economy is also characterized by inefficiencies, statist policy, and dependence on gas and oil exports. Iran indirectly controls several companies linked to the country's security forces and directly

controls and owns hundreds of state-owned companies. The economy is weighed down by distortions such as price controls, corruption, subsidies, and banking systems with billions of US dollars in non-performing loans, sabotaging the possibility of private-sector-led growth.(worldbank.org, 2021)

The private sector activities include: small-scale workshops, medium-scale construction, metalworking, mining, cement production, agriculture, and some manufacturing and services. Corruption is widespread, and there is a significant presence of informal market activity in the country's economy. (cia.gov, 2022)

In January 2016, revenues started to recover thanks to the resumption of oil production. This was due to lifting the nuclear-related sanctions previously imposed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Economically, Iran underwent rapid and successful growth under the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shah. Revenues from the oil trade contributed significantly to the development of energy, agriculture, and mineral resources. The land reform program introduced in 1962 replaced the traditional land tenure system in which farmers had been part-tenants or sharecroppers. At that time, Iran's manufacturing palette also included a variety of construction materials and consumer goods, in addition to the typical carpet production. However, it can be said that oil was responsible for Iran's economic lifeblood. Since Iran was at the forefront of economic power in the 1970s thanks to oil, it has been able to host investments that have helped meet the oil needs of many industrialized countries, generating huge profits and increasing the country's economic strength. This triggered rapid GDP growth in the country, but this growth slowed in 2017 as oil production stagnated. (worldbank.org, 2016)



5. Figure Crude oil production in Iran (1975-2020)

Source: <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49116> Downloaded: 2022.04.08.

However, compared to the previous paragraph, after 1979, the economy of Iran changed significantly. Several factors have influenced Iran's economic decline. These include, for example, the war with Iraq, which led to a reciprocal decline in oil exports. The second factor is the significant drop in the price of oil. The decline was at a record high in 1986, when oil revenues fell from \$20.5 billion a year in 1979 to only \$5.3 billion in '86. In terms of GDP growth, in numerical terms, this had an impact that reduced the annual 15.2% in '86 to a mere 0.2% in 1984. The considerable strain on the economy was due to the fiscal burden on the state budget of the war with Iraq, the fall in the price of oil, incompetent economic management, descending agricultural production, and further exacerbating inflation (30-50%), and creating further budget deficits. (Clawson, 1981)

Iran's economic development can be divided into distinct periods. One such turning point was the period after 1988 when Iran accepted the ceasefire resolution imposed by the UN. This was a kind of starting point for reforming the economic activities. This reform marked the implementation of economic and social developments in Iran over a five-year period from 1989 to 1994. It was an economic reform with several leading aspects, including the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, the revival of market mechanisms, and the deregulation of the economy. (Amirahmadi, 1995)

All these actions have resulted in specific positive outcomes for the Iranian state, such as a reduction in the budget deficit and economic growth and progress. Overall, during the five

years of economic reform, GDP has increased by an average of 7% in real terms over the period 1989-92 mentioned above. Among other things, the general government deficit went from 9% of GDP in the first year of the five-year reform to 2% in the final year of the planned economic reform period. In addition, the inflation rate turned from 29% in 1988 to 10% in 1990. (Amuzegar, 2004)

Further indicators, expressed as a percentage, illustrate that the five-year plan introduced has positively impacted the economy. For example, gas, water, and electricity production grew by 18.9%, agricultural production by 5.6%, transport by 18.9%, and industrial production by 15%. These achievements are partly due to the fact that the Government of Iran has introduced a structural management program, which is based on substantially similar principles to the IMF's program for developing countries in return for aid allocations. In general, however, it can be said that during this period, Iran did not require any aid but rather, through self-imposed government adjustments, made its economy more market-oriented, thereby liberalizing it. In all these actions, it successfully preserved its authoritarian regime. Rafsanjani, who was president at the time, called for several structural changes. These included deregulation, encouraging foreign investment, reducing state subsidies, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Although these reforms were well-intentioned in their aims and ideals, they have had a slight positive impact. The planned privatization has been remarkably ineffective. It was noticeable during this period that political corruption and rampant patronage were making considerable inroads in areas of the economy, resulting in a situation where a vast number of companies were centralized in the hands of a tiny elite. (Amuzegar, 2004)

Consequently, 86% of Iran's GDP was state-owned in 1997. Attempts at deregulation have had a similar outcome. In 1996, the 24 ministries in Iran issued more than 250 regulations, mainly relating to exports and imports, but these were repetitive or contradictory in many cases. (2009-2017.state.gov, 2022)

In April 1995, the United States of America, believing that Iran was supporting international terrorism, imposed retaliatory investment and trade sanctions on the country. Even though the US's strongest allies did not resort to imposing these sanctions themselves, the US action had a significant economic impact, most notably in the form of a sharp fall in the worth of the rial, which the government had no choice except to prop up. (home.treasury.gov, 2022)

Following the economic stimulus ideas and model of the above-mentioned Five-Year Plan, the second Five-Year Development Plan was implemented in Iran in 1994. Priorities on

the list of the second five-year plan included increasing social spending and completing development and infrastructure projects. There was steady growth in Iran's economy, reflected in the stable growth of 4.2% in 1996. Nevertheless, as in the past, inflation remained a continuing problem. A significant decline in inflation was observed between 1995 and '94, falling from 50% to almost half of 27%. The following years were also promising in terms of inflation, with inflation falling to almost 24% in 1998. In the same year, the rate of unemployment was at 30%. With the advent of the 2000s, Iran embarked on a third five-year economic plan. During this period, it envisaged the privatisation of more than 2,000 small state-owned companies and at least six large state-owned tobacco and agro-industrial companies. (Amuzegar, 2004)

Before the UN nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, which will be explained in more detail in the upcoming next big section of the thesis, the following paragraph is a few sentences on the economy of Iran today. Since most of the nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the JCPOA were lifted in January 2016, we have seen a recovery in Iran's revenues and oil production. (armscontrol.org, 2022)

This has resulted in rapid GDP growth, but the stagnation of oil production in 2017 has led to a rapid decline in GDP growth. Overall, the economy is still suffering from the pre-JCPOA slowdown, which has led to low levels of investment and low productivity, and high unemployment (especially among Iranian youth and women who have graduated from college). (worldbank.org, 2017)

In May 2017, the re-election of President Hassan Rouhani, who raised hopes for economic change that would reach all sectors of society in the future, was a source of much hope. Following Rouhani's election, he has been tasked with stimulating private-sector growth and attracting foreign investment by introducing structural reforms to improve Iran's ability to do business and strengthen the banking sector. (nytimes.com, 2022)

#### **1.4 Iran's army**

This paragraph provides an overview of the Iranian armed forces. Iran, formerly known as Persia, was one of the largest empires in the world, with over 2,500 years of history. However, today's Iran was established after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and the current state of the armed forces that have emerged and existed since then is described in this paragraph. The origins of the modern Iranian army date back to the 1920s. It was then that Reza Khan, a



member of the Persian Cossack Brigade, formed the Artesh, which means army in Persian, as a result of a coup to consolidate the Shah's power. Reza Khan became prime minister, and soon he appointed himself as the Shah to modernize the country and include the military in this process. (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019)

As the historical events of the 1920s unfolded, Reza Shah was forced to hand over to his son, who, after 1953, as Shah, made it a priority to create a strong army in Iran, and so during the Cold War, he expanded his Artesh armada with military equipment, mainly from the United States. These consisted of F-14 F-4 fighter aircraft, m60 tanks, attack helicopters, and various types of missiles. By the late 1970s, America was the number one buyer of U.S. military equipment. During the reign of Mohamad Reza Shah, Iran became extremely autocratic, causing the masses to be dissatisfied with the Shah's leadership and to view him as a puppet of America. Due to this civil unrest, several protests erupted, and these protests turned into a revolution in 1979, resulting in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's election as Shah. (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019)

With the introduction of a referendum on April 1, 1979, Iranians adopted a new constitution. On the tenth day after the election of Artesh Khomeini, he declared that he would remain neutral, thus avoiding further losses. Therefore, following the revolution, Iran had a neutral Artesh, and in May, Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).<sup>17</sup> Thus, it came about that the Iran had two primary services. Besides the artesh as regular forces and the Islamic revolutionary guard corps, there is also the national police force called the Law Enforcement Force. These three services make up the armed forces of Iran. (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019)

The composition of the Iranian armed forces is made up of personnel in active military roles, reserve forces, and police forces, as follows:

- Approximately 600,000 active military service personnel
- Approximately 450,000 active reservists and at least 500,000 to 1 million inactive reservists
- Law enforcement force approximately 200,000-300,000

Iran's recruitment is carried out by the conscription service, which is a service of 18 to 24 months, but there are also some volunteers outside of the conscription.

In terms of equipment, Iran's military, as is clear from the above, is made up of equipment procured from Western countries and includes a significant amount of Chinese and Soviet-era weaponry. More generally, Iran also has several new types of domestically produced systems.

Iran's military has identified particular core strengths and vulnerabilities which are multifaceted and have multiple causes. The strength of its forces is underpinned by its vast ballistic missile inventory, numerous proxy and unconventional partners, both in the trade of war materiel and in the conduct of operations, its manpower capabilities, and its littoral naval capabilities. However, its dual military structure significantly weakens the coordination of its armed forces, and it has limited or no access to certain modern weapons and technologies. (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019)

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)		Regular Forces (Artesh)	
IRGC Ground Force (IRGC GF)	150,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF)	350,000
IRGC Navy (IRGCN)	20,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)	18,000
IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)	15,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)	37,000
IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF)	5,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)	15,000
Basij (Reserves)	450,000	<b>Total:</b>	<b>420,000</b>
<b>Total (excl. Basij)</b>	<b>190,000</b>		
<b>Total (incl. Basij)</b>	<b>640,000</b>		
<b>Total Military (Active): 610,000</b>			
<b>Total Military (incl. Reserves): 1,060,000</b>			

6. Figure Iranian Armed Forces

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency (2019) Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance [https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military\\_Powers\\_Publications/Iran\\_Military\\_Power\\_LR.pdf](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf) Downloaded: 2022.04.020

## 2. THE ARMS EMBARGO

### 2.1 Historical overview

Nuclear weapons and civil nuclear technologies, on the one hand, potentially pose a threat which extent depends on the purpose for which the state uses them, and, on the other hand, the

development of these technologies can undeniably contribute to the prestige of a state and the symbolism of its model. In general, however, few countries globally have the full range of nuclear technologies and all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle due to the diversity of these stages. According to the U.S Energy Information Administration, "The nuclear fuel cycle consists of front-end steps that prepare uranium for use in nuclear reactors and back-end steps to manage safely, prepare, and dispose of used or burnt-out but still highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel."(eia.gov, 2021)

The beginning of Iran's nuclear program dates back to 1957 when a civilian nuclear program was launched under the US Atoms for Peace program. In 1968, Iran acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which led to the signing of a full safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. This agreement authorized the IAEA to carry out regular monitoring activities on nuclear matters on Iranian territory. In 1974, with an agreement to build 4 nuclear power plants, the Shah declared that in order to have sufficient amount oil for export, the goal was to create 23,000 MWe of nuclear capacity through the four plants. (The Iran Primer, 2020)

Within the framework of international cooperation, a lengthy process was launched in 1975 to build 2 units in Bushehr, in the Persian Gulf area. These units were based on the German Biblis b reactor design. After the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini halted the nuclear construction program, so the work at Bushehr, which was soon abandoned, resulted in only one substantially complete unit being built and two others only half completed. (world-nuclear.org, 2021)

Further complicating construction was the fact that the plant was hit by several missile attacks between 1984 and 1988. (nuke.fas.org, 2000) Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq warfare, Iran tried to find a partner to complete the Bushehr plant, but several factors hindered the process of building international cooperation. One of these factors was mounting pressure from the United States. Another was the tightening international environment in the wake of Iraq's covert nuclear program, which hampered Iran's efforts and set back the search for partners for the plant for years. However, in August 1992, Russia and Iran agreed in Moscow to build and operate a two-unit plant. The agreement stipulated that Russian contractors would carry out a significant part of the construction of the nuclear power plant from equipment already on site. The parties also agreed on the transfer of fuel from the nuclear powerplants and the burnt-out heaters to Russia. (world-nuclear-news.org, 2014)



7. Figure Iran's Nuclear Facilities

Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11927720> Downloaded: 2022.04.23.

In the early 2000s, preparation of a site to accommodate a uranium centrifuge line began in Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, and a heavy water plant and reprocessing plant were under construction in the town of Arak. (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 2016)

This in itself would not have been of great significance, given the presence elsewhere of these civilian-use facilities. The problem, and the reason why this has had such significance and international repercussions, is that Iran has not followed through on its obligations and has only reported these operations to the IAEA after they were made public by opposition activists. Furthermore, there was concern that uranium enrichment is one of the most dangerous technologies in the fuel cycle at the international level. At this point, the introduction of specific processes can initiate nuclear weapons production. As a result, Iran has been investigated and found to have contradictory statements to the IAEA. Further questions have been asked to establish whether Iran has violated the safeguards agreement, despite being one of the first countries to sign the NPT and its associated obligations. (armscontrol.org, 2022)

A November 2003 IAEA report revealed that Iran had violated the safeguards agreement on several points. It has developed nuclear weapons technologies and concealed them from the IAEA. It also revealed that plutonium separation from used nuclear fuel rods was conducted on a laboratory scale. In addition, uranium enrichment was also conducted, and these processes were concealed for 22 years. Iran has admitted these findings, but they claim that these activities were all insignificant. (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2003)

Iran has been called on to suspend its uranium enrichment processes. In August 2005, the IAEA BoG called for the process to be halted and the following year presented to the UN Security Council its demand that Iran cease all reprocessing and enrichment-related activities. (iaea.org, 2022) Despite this, Iran has continued to pursue the activities outlined in demand and has not backed down in the face of the call.

In March 2007, unanimously recognized sanctions were inflicted upon Iran under the UNSC Resolution 1747. Furthermore, the obligation to suspend uranium enrichment activities imposed by the IAEA Board was confirmed. In its May 2007 report, the IAEA states that Iran has ceased to provide the required information, ignoring the Additional Protocol. In light of this, the IAEA wrote in a 2007 statement that it could not determine the existence of undeclared nuclear activities and material in the country because the supplementary manual had not been applied and ratified. (un.org, 2007)

Environmental samples as of May 2010 confirmed that both enrichment plants constructed are operating as reported, and the Fuel enrichment plant is producing enrichment below 5.0%. (IAEA Board of Governors (2010)

However, the international concern mentioned earlier was based on the fact that the process is roughly 90% compliant with the production of weapons-grade material. Furthermore, a minor step would have been required to bring the process up to the level of weapons production. For this, Iran would have needed only a small-scale clandestine plant. Iran has built a new uranium enrichment plant at Fordow, about 20 kilometers from Qom, in an underground tunnel complex at a military base, which it announced as a fact in September 2009 after the project was internationally publicized. (france24.com, 2009)

Adding to the difficulty of the predicament at the time was the emergence of concerns such as the legitimacy of certain countries to carry out uranium processing and enrichment activities under safeguards, the withdrawal of these countries from the NPT, and the subsequent complete reconfiguration of their facilities to produce nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United States feared just such a scenario with Iran.

Nevertheless, this concern was confirmed when the government of Iran instructed the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) operating in Iran to begin enriching uranium to 19.75% for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This act was intended to narrow the gap between weapons-grade uranium and low-enriched standard material. (nti.org, 2020)

## **2.2 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**

In 2012, the IAEA requested access to the Parchin site, where alleged high-explosives tests linked to nuclear weapons experiments were carried out. The request was invariably rejected by Iran, which refused permission to enter. This has significantly set back the IAEA's ability to carry out inspections effectively. These actions by Iran are considered a significant issue in the 2015 JCPOA and a setback to the implementation of the 2013 Geneva Convention. It is also an impediment to addressing questions about alleged activities and nuclear weapons. (reuters.com, 2014)

Iran has committed to comply with the measures imposed on the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, as described in its agreement with the IAEA, by the August 2014 deadline. This was followed by a new agreement in November 2013 that put joint cooperation with the IAEA into force. In this agreement, it was stated that "Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues." (iaea.org, 2013)

In addition, the agreement also addressed several other significant concerns, such as concerns over the operation of the heavy water reactor and the centrifuge enrichment program. Overall, the agreement was not only a test of cooperation but also a test to verify and test the agreement on the central issues, the smooth start of the negotiation process, and the smooth cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.

The E3/EU+3 (the US, the UK, France, China, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) as well as Iran agreed on a JCPOA on 14 July 2015. (policy.asiapacificenergy.org, 2022)

The full implementation of the Plan of Action ensured that Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful and would eliminate Iran's apparent ambitions to develop a nuclear arsenal. The implementation of the JCPOA has allowed for the termination of every UN Security Council embargo on Iran's nuclear program, and also the general lifting of multilateral and national sanctions on the country. The Plan of Action took a step-by-step approach and included mutual commitments as agreed and approved by the UN Security Council. (eeas.europa.eu, 2015)

The renewed verification activities, significant pressure, modest reduction of sanctions, and containment of the nuclear program contained in the previously signed IAEA declaration were perfectly linked to the Interim Joint Action Plan. The Joint plan included a general section

dealing with the substantive content of the agreement, as follows: preamble and general provisions, nuclear issues, sanctions, implementation plan, and dispute settlement mechanism, all complemented by five annexes. Five main events in the process are to be distinguished: finalization, adoption, implementation, transition, and repeal of the UNSC Resolution. The finalization took place on 14 July 2015 (europarl.europa.eu, 2015)

The E3/EU+3 and Iran successfully concluded the JCPOA negotiations and approved the Plan of Action. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2015. It entered into force on 18 October 2015, the date of its adoption. Iran has started to implement its nuclear-related commitments. During this period, Iran has made commitments on issues such as suspending developments at the Arak heavy water reactor, the Fordow, and Natanz enrichment plants and not enriching uranium above 5%. (armscontrol.org, 2022)

Furthermore, it does not plan to install more centrifuges beyond the given amount at that time. The commitments also included diluting half of the existing 20% enriched uranium to a maximum enrichment of 3.76%. In addition, the IAEA will ensure access for inspectors to verify nuclear activities and allow a free flow of information.

In return, of course, the countries concerned have implemented various measures, such as sanctions on precious metals and gold and the lifting of sanctions on petrochemical exports. The European Union has adopted the necessary legal instruments to lift all EU economic and financial sanctions on Iran's nuclear program, as set out in the Plan of Action. On the day of implementation, the IAEA Director-General submitted a report to the IAEA BoG and the United Nations Security Council confirming that Iran had taken the measures set out in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA and that the EU economic and financial sanctions on Iran's nuclear program had been lifted on the same day. (iaea.org, 2022)

In addition, there are nuclear proliferation-related sanctions and restrictions that will remain in place after the date of implementation of the Plan. The arms embargo, sanctions related to missile technology, restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and activities, provisions on certain metals and software subject to the licensing regime, and related designations, which will remain in force after the date of implementation of the Plan of Action. (sipri.org, 2021)

For those items that remain prohibited, the measures concerning the screening of consignments to and from Iran, as well as those related to the supply of ships or their fuel, should continue to apply after the date of implementation of the JCPOA.

### **2.3 Sanctions under the JCPOA**

The purchase or sale, supply, provision, or transfer, directly or indirectly, of arms and related materiel of all types, including ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for all such arms and related materiel, including the provision of related services, shall remain prohibited after the date of implementation of the JCPOA. The EU arms embargo covers all items on the EU Common Military List. (United Nations Security Council, 2015)

The prohibition on the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer, export, and procurement of goods and technology related to missile technology, including the provision of related services, and on all other items which a member state determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, remain in force. (United Nations Security Council, 2015)

There may also be a point in the plan covering persons and entities that remain subject to restrictive measures. Certain persons and entities on the UN and EU lists will continue to be subject to asset freezes and visa bans, and a ban on the provision of special financial messaging services until the date of transition. (United Nations Security Council, 2015)

For particular commodities and technologies, as well as associated services like technical and financial aid, and investments, transfers, and activities involving proliferation risks will require prior authorization according to the Member's appropriate authorities concerned on a case-by-case basis, as from the date of implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.

The Joint Plan of Action states that if a participant in the overall joint action plan considers that the commitments made have not been fulfilled, a consultation procedure should be launched. The participants in the overall joint action plan will attempt to resolve the issue in accordance with the procedures set out in the overall joint action plan. Suppose, at the conclusion of the process, the issue has not been rectified to the complainant's satisfaction, and according to the latter, there has been a significant breach of the Plan's commitments. In that case, it may so notify the UN Security Council. The UNSC shall, pursuant to its rules of procedure, take a vote on a decision to proceed with the lifting of sanctions. The requirements of the corresponding SC Resolutions shall be reintroduced if such a course of action is not made within 30 days of the notice ("snapback" provision) except if the UNSC determines differently. (france24.com, 2020)



## 2.4 Recent major happenings

According to IAEA reports in November 2015, Iran has withdrawn a significant amount of equipment from circulation. At Natanz's fuel enrichment plant, 4,112 IR-1 centrifuges and 160 IR-2 centrifuges and related infrastructure were taken out of service. The decommissioned devices and other equipment were stored on a site under the supervision and control of the IAEA. At the same time, 258 IR-1 centrifuges and related infrastructure were removed from the Fordow site. (Davenport, 2015)

Under the JCPOA, Iran shipped more than eleven tonnes of various types of low enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015. The IAEA has started an inspection to gather information on whether Iran's enriched uranium stockpile contains 3.6% U-235 or less than 300 kg. In exchange for the enriched uranium that left the country, Iran imported 137 tonnes of natural uranium into the country, much of which was provided by Kazakhstan. (Heinonen, 2017)

In January 2016, the core of the heavy water reactor in Arak was removed. (Yeranian, 2016) In the same month, the implementation day arrived, when the IAEA carried out an inspection to verify whether Iran had implemented its previous nuclear commitments and formally submitted its report to the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board Governors.

On 8 May 2018, US President Donald Trump announced in Washington that the United States would withdraw from the 2015 Multi-Power Treaty on Iran's nuclear program. The US President also signed a memorandum to lift sanctions against Iran. Although the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that the country respects the agreement, the administration of US President Donald Trump unilaterally denounced the deal in 2018, claiming that its text did not contain sufficient guarantees to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. However, Washington's attempts have not succeeded. (nytimes.com, 2022)

Several European country tried to save the agreement between Iran and the countries involved by trying to persuade Tehran not to violate the the agreement despite of the fact that Washington was trying to make thing harded for Iran. Also it was reassuring to Iran that at that time America faced big political changes. Joe Biden was about to take office as the newly elected American president, which was a favourable thing to Iran, considering the fact that Biden had the intentions to stick to the agreement as it was before Trump's quit. It was also backed up by the fact that Biden was part of Obama's presidency administration, which concluded the agreement.

The additional sanctions set out in the agreement would be triggered if Iran breaches its commitments on uranium enrichment. Tehran did breach the commitments in 2020, when it increased its production of enriched uranium, claiming that the EU and other signatories failed to protect it from US trade sanctions after the US stepped out of the nuclear deal in 2018. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing also believe that Washington has no right to call for an extension of the arms embargo, as it has made it virtually impossible to comply with the nuclear deal by withdrawing from the agreement two years earlier.

As a part of the additional sanctions the deal had reduced the stockpile of Iran's enriched uranium. The limit was 200 kg, which was drastically smaller than the previously owned 8 tonnes. Iran did in fact reach and go beyond that limit in 2019. The IAEA estimated that Iran has about 250 kg of uranium. Also the fissile purity was put under a limit, which was about 3%. This was a drastical change compared to the previously reached 20 percent. It was clear in 2019, that Iran did in fact go beyond the limit and had reached almost 5 percent enrichment level. Eventough there were breaches in the previously set limits, Iran had the right under the agreement to enrich uranium in Natanz with the usage of more than 5000 centrifuges under the ground. Still this number was a major setback compered to the building's capacity which was built to operate 50 thousand centrifuges. In addition to the underground operations, Iran was allowed to operate a small portion of advanced equipment above ground level, with the exception that Iran cannot stockpile the already enriched uranium. Even well before the agreement Iran already had built a couple of ten thousand centrifuges.

Some experts say that these violations that Iran had done against the agreement, put them in a position of having a smaller window of breakout, which is the timespan to enrich uranium to the point that it can be used as weapons. But it is still unclear wether this timespan really got smaller or it is just speculation. Several expert in nuclear matters say that in order to Iran's capability to produce weapongrade nuclear equipment, It would take still way more than a year to do so. Additionally to the time and the fact that Iran needs a sufficient amount of well enriched uranium, Iran also has to create a small bomb that can be equipped on ballistic rockets. Exactly how long this will take is unclear, but the accepted view is that the biggest obstacle to producing the weapon is the accumulation of a sufficient stockpile of fissile material.

Federica Mogherini, declared that the EU's stance has not altered; the nuclear deal would improve Europe's security, avert a Middle East nuclear weapons race, assist Iran economically, and create vital new paths for diplomacy and engagement, even if they are challenging. (Heath, 2018)

On 18 October 2020, Iran declared that the arms embargo imposed on it under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 had expired. The Iranian Foreign Ministry said, "As of today, all restrictions on the transfer of arms, related activities and financial services to and from Iran, and all prohibitions regarding the entry into or transit through territories of the UN Member States previously imposed on a number of Iranian citizens and military officials, are all automatically terminated." in addition "the lifting of arms restrictions and the travel ban were designed to be automatic with no other action required." (business-standard.com, 2020)

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif also said in a Twitter post that „A momentous day for the international community, which has protected UNSC Res. 2231 and JCPOA. ...Today's normalization of Iran's defense cooperation with the world is a win for the cause of multilateralism and peace and security in our region.” (tehrantimes.com, 2020)

## **2.5 How will the situation continue?**

In the context of the events described above, we can ask what will happen next, how relations between Iran and the countries of the world will develop, the consequences of lifting the arms embargo, and how the international situation will be will evolve. The answers to these questions can be outlined in three main areas. The first is whether, as a consequence of the lifting of the embargo, Iran will be able to engage in the arms trade, whether it will be able to sell arms or whether it will be restricted from buying arms. Consequently, the second question is: if it can trade in both directions, what assets will it trade. Which country would Iran like to trade with, and which instruments would it like to offer for trading? Furthermore, based on the previous two questions, the third question is what are Iran's objectives for the future?

The new situation could also allow Iran to reduce US influence, lift economic sanctions, and act as a military deterrent. However, Iran has no intention of launching an arms race in the Persian Gulf after the UN embargo expires, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif told an online meeting of the UN Security Council recently. Some analysts say Iran is not expected to embark on a massive arms purchase, justified by the financial constraints resulting from the sanctions imposed on the country. Many analysts say Iran will be keen to show it can buy arms - mainly from Russia and China - while abiding by international rules. Iran is likely to buy only what it does not have, with purchases more limited to parts and technology. Furthermore, with the end of the arms embargo, Tehran will be able to buy weapons and sell them to its allies, to specific countries such as Syria, Sudan, Latin American countries, or non-state actors in the

region. Since the 2003 war in Iraq, Iranian strategic thinking has been about the world's leading military power (the United States), together with Israel or alone, constantly threatening Iran by surrounding the Middle Eastern power in a ring.

In this sense, many analysts believe that Iran has made it a priority to significantly develop its own arms industry under the sanctions regime that has been in place for many years. At a press conference on the lifting of the arms embargo, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh quipped that Iran's main priority, according to calculations, is to sell more weapons and military hardware than it buys. This, of course, would significantly boost Iran's non-oil export revenues. Nafez Arefi Hamid Reza, Iran's ambassador in Budapest, pointed out that Arms sales by neighboring powers significantly outstrip Iran's arms purchases. Generally speaking, Iran's arms sales are not on a par with those of Turkey, the UAE, or neighboring countries with similar capabilities. As a precedent, Iraq was the largest buyer of Iranian-made arms in 2014, with spending reaching some \$195 million. "They reportedly included communication systems, short-range multiple rocket launchers (the Type 63/Fajr-1 107-mm system), anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles (copies of the M40 106-mm rifles), and sniper rifles (such as the Sayyad rifles produced in Iran without a license-a copy of the Austrian Steyr HS. Iran also delivered vehicles, like the locally produced Safir 4×4 multipurpose light vehicles used by Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia militia in Iraq." (Czulda, 2020)

In 2013, the online news portal The Atlantic reported the discovery of Iranian-supplied ammunition in some nine African countries. Furthermore, according to Reuters, independent experts from the UN Security Council have investigated evidence that Sudanese troops have used Iranian-supplied military vehicles to transport rubbish. In addition, an unspecified number of Mohajer and Ababil-3 piloted unmanned aerial vehicles and Boragh vehicles were also found in Sudan, all of Iranian origin. Sudan possessed a significant arsenal of Iranian-origin weapons, according to a 2015 article detailing that Iran supplied large quantities of landmines, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launchers, light machine guns, and mortar tubes. All of these weapons were procured under a military cooperation agreement signed in 2007 between Iran and Sudan in a framework to provide each other with a significant arsenal of weapons. The above-mentioned UAV drones, for example, were used for anti-regime surveillance in Darfur, according to some sources who found the inscription Iran Aviation Manufacturing Ind Co. on the side of a drone they shot down. (Rosen, 2015)

It is a widely-known fact that Iran cooperates with and supports many sympathizer militant groups in neighboring countries, even with military equipment, in order to maintain its

position vis-à-vis rival countries in the region. Examples of this are the ammunition and light weapons supplied to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria and the equipment supplied to the Lebanese Karonan group Hezbollah. In addition, the armaments used by a Yemeni Houthi insurgent group launched in 2020 against a Saudi Arabian oil company included parts that, like the drones shot down in Iraq, contained some Iranian-origin components. In an interview with the Associated Press, Jonah Leff of Conflict Armament Research said “This gyroscope ... we’ve seen it now enough times in Iranian-manufactured material to be able to confidently say that the presence of it in a Houthi-produced item suggests that the material was supplied from Iran,” (Gambrell, 2020)

However, what can be said about these arms transfers is that they are more of a proxy supporting strategic function, reinforcing Iran's role in the region, and less of a proxy for the process of arms export and import between conventional countries.

As described above, it is clear that Iran has an extensive repertoire of both weapons for sale and customers to buy those weapons. However, overall, the total arsenal of weapons that Iran could sell is not fully identifiable, and the quantity and strength of these weapons are unclear. As the country has been prevented for several years by sanctions from purchasing modern weapons, Iran has been forced to redesign and modernize its own more or less obsolete weapons. There are several products that Iran has developed in-house, and these are specifically intended for export. These include anti-tank systems and a vast range of missile systems, from simple self-guided to guided missile systems designed to destroy tanks and other warfare assets. (Czulda, 2020)

Iran's drone technology is also one of the most advanced in the region, and many countries are interested in acquiring this technology. For example, at the International Aviation and Space Show in Russia in 2019, Brigadier General Abdolkarim Banitarafi said that Russia and China are also very interested in buying drones of their own manufacture, which are being demonstrated by Iran's Aviation Industries Organization (AIO). (tasnimnews.com, 2019)

However, the UN arms embargo was still in place at the time, so the deal could not go ahead, but Abdolkarim Banitarafi said that several countries were interested in buying Iranian weapons and that negotiations on purchases could begin as soon as the arms embargo was lifted. In addition, some cruise and ballistic missiles and radar systems have attracted the attention of countries interested in Iran's arsenal. (Czulda, 2020)

Nevertheless, Iran could not only provide equipment to buyers, but it could also provide a range of other services. We can mention here the modernization and repair and maintenance of the equipment for sale since it is Iranian-made. In general, labor costs are low in Iran, so less wealthy countries are more interested and attracted to use these services. For example, many African countries may find it beneficial to trade with Iran.

It is visible that Iran has a considerable arsenal of weapons. It has many systems for military use, ranging from firearms and missile systems to air-to-air weapons and radar systems. In conclusion, it can also be said that, under 13 years of sanctions, Iran has shifted to an economic plan that is independent of the surrounding countries and the world's major powers. Therefore, the country has sought to be self-sufficient and prove that it can deploy significant military assets despite the sanctions and the maximum pressure exercised by the United States. The above list of assets for sale or already sold is proof of this. It was also mentioned above that it is unlikely that Iran will embark on a massive arms purchase after the embargo is lifted. However, it can be said that if it buys a small amount of equipment, it can use its existing military technology to produce a variant of the weapons it has bought and possibly upgrade and modernize the system. After the end of the embargo, Iran's limited financial resources will force it to prioritize military procurement, so Tehran plans to focus primarily on strengthening its military air force, air defense, and air transport capabilities. Furthermore, it is clear that with the end of the arms embargo, Iran will regain its legitimate room for maneuver in international governance, thus re-launching its economic, military, and other strengthening activities at regional and international levels.

The three questions that were formulated at the beginning of this paragraph have thus been answered: what kind of arms-related activities Iran may engage in after the end of the embargo and what some speculate are its future goals based on its past activities. However, the question of which countries would be interested in trading with Iran after the arms embargo remains unanswered. On a global level, it is fair to say, and several historical precedents suggest, that Russia should be mentioned as one of Iran's largest trading partners. The relationship between the two countries can be examined at both regional and international levels. In general, it can be concluded that, regionally, Russia's national interests are focused on building a good relationship and joint stability in cooperation with Iran. We can see several common interests between Moscow and Tehran, especially in strengthening the multipolar world order and the UN. (Sleiman-Haidar, 2018)

At the regional level, we can identify cooperation on specific Middle East and Central Asian issues as a common goal, for example, in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. Although Iran is not a primary trade or investment partner, the total bilateral trade volume of 1.9 billion dollars and cooperation in the energy and agricultural sectors are particularly important. (statista.com, 2020)

Russia is also linked to other regional actors in the Middle East; for example, it has sold many more weapons to Iran's rivals than to Iran. These ties are unlikely to be damaged simply because of Iranian interests.

Another significant international player to mention concerning trade is China. In evaluating Beijing's position, many scholars argue that China wants to avoid playing the kind of security and political role that the United States has played throughout the last couple decades in the Middle East, as it could very quickly lose significant revenues and damage its international relations interests. According to some experts, the Asian superpower is moving cautiously in the Middle East. Beijing's relations with Washington heavily influence the Iran-China relationship. China is also increasingly trying to manage conflicts of interest with Russia and is pushing for more balanced relations. Tehran and Beijing could reach a trade agreement on developing air transport capacity. China is also seeking to develop a good relationship with Iran, although its position will not be affected by selling more arms to Iran or any of its partners in the region. A long-term oil supply agreement with China was signed in the spring, which has already seen half a million barrels of Iranian crude oil arriving in Chinese ports every day in the last quarter. This process is actually weakening the impact of Western sanctions, because it is putting hard currency into Tehran's coffers, and no one has to account for that amount. In September, President Raisi also reaped the first political fruits of the strategy when he moved from the ranks of observer to full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This offers him a significant perspective, as he can align his economy directly (i.e., without day-to-day political considerations) with the goals of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia. The SCO is still a rarely mentioned organization for its size, but it has enormous potential. It is not a political organization like the European Union or NATO, and even hostile actors are part of it. It includes 40% of the world's population and accounts for one-fifth of global GDP, more than the European Union. (Kaleji, 2021)

## **2.6 The possible elimination of the nuclear programme by external forces**

In 2018, former US President Donald Trump withdrew his nation from the Iran nuclear pact. Despite the fact that the remaining countries in the deal (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union) have stayed true to the provisions of the pact, Iran has responded to Trump's decision by ramping up its enrichment of fissile material. Experts estimate that creating enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon will take only a few months.

Joe Biden has failed to get his nation back into the accord, and French President Emmanuel Macron urged for an advancement of talks and a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear situation on January 30, 2022. Meanwhile, the internal political situation in Iran has shifted, necessitating a deal with Iran's conservative Prime Minister Ebrahim Raiszi. (english.alarabiya.net, 2022)

It is unclear what course the main nations' discussions with Tehran would go, but Israel has regularly mentioned the possibility of hitting Iranian nuclear installations in recent years, though this would be a more complicated endeavor than it might sound. The attack on the Osirak nuclear power facility drew US condemnation at the time, and the Biden administration, which completed the Afghanistan pullout, could not be expected to give military support for such strike against Iran.

Furthermore, unlike the nuclear power plant in Baghdad, Iran's nuclear program is dispersed across the large country, making it hard to decommission the whole program in a single focused hit. Furthermore, Iranian facilities are by definition further away from Israel (1200-1500 kilometers) than the Osirak nuclear power facility was at the time.

Just as the domestic political situation in Iran has changed in recent years, the global political situation is also changing. With a significant number of Arab countries fearing Iran's encroachment in the Middle East, an Arab-Israeli coalition may be possible, facilitated by the Abraham Accord signed in the White House in August 2020, which brought about a peace agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A month later, Bahrain signed a peace agreement and Sudan resumed diplomatic relations with Israel. (Baker et al, 2020)

In the Middle East, Israel's relations with three countries, including Jordan, have now been normalised, although Saudi Arabia is more cautious, but there are also reports of rapprochement. As mentioned above, Iran's nuclear facilities make it very difficult to carry out an operation because of their great distance and large area, but with Arab allies it no longer



seems impossible. The UAE air bases are closer to Iran, so it would be advisable to launch bombing from there. If not the full nuclear infrastructure, the Busehr nuclear power plant is certainly within reach of the Emirates.

Moreover, around 2012, it was unofficially announced that Azerbaijan would make its airbases available to the Israelis in the event of military action against Iran. Today, even in the event of a possible Israeli-Arab coalition, the use of Azerbaijani bases would provide considerable tactical advantages. (haaretz.com, 2012)

We cannot verify the veracity of the offer, but Azerbaijan has good relations with Israel, as evidenced by the acquisition of high-value Israeli weapons, and Azerbaijan has differences with Tehran over the Azeri small border in northern Iran. Azeri-Iranian relations are not helped by the fact that Armenia enjoyed Iran's support during the Nagorno-Karabakh clashes in 2020. Opposing forces (Motamedi, 2020)

If the available military equipment is taken into account, Israel's Air and Space Forces have also made significant progress. A few years ago, the 5th generation of US-built F-35s began to enter service, representing a generational leap from the otherwise state-of-the-art F-15s and F-16s in the air force. The F-35 is a so-called "stealth" aircraft with a combat range of up to 1,000 kilometres. (Anthony, 2016)

The US has previously supplied the UAE with 80 F-16s, which are among the most advanced in the family. In recent years, the UAE, along with several other Arab countries, has embarked on a massive arms procurement programme, where money has been the least important factor. Technically speaking, therefore, there is the potential for a series of strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, but, over and above the difficulties mentioned above (such as the large size of the facilities), the capabilities of the Iranian army cannot be ignored. (Boese, n.a.)

Following the US arms embargo after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian Air Force was forced to operate fighter aircraft previously procured from US sources without US supply of spare parts.

Even if some of the technical equipment of the Iranian Air Force is considered obsolete, it is unlikely that the Israelis could carry out an operation like the one in Iraq without losses. If the political consequences of a bombing campaign are considered, it is possible that public opinion in Israel and the Arab countries would approve of the impossibility of Iran's nuclear programme, but the reactions of international public opinion are more difficult to predict.

The United States would certainly not support such an action, as it is unlikely to confront Moscow, which supports Iran, on a new 'front' in parallel with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, or in the near future. The major powers involved in the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme are also unlikely to welcome a separate track. An all-out Iranian attack on Arab countries or Israel is unlikely, but it is almost certain that the Tehran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas terrorist organisations would be more active in attacking Israeli territory with their missiles. (Reuters, 2020)

At present, the chances of a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities are slim, but there are developments that make it likely that the possibility of an attack is being maintained.

However, Israel, wishing to bring forward the start of deliveries, originally scheduled for 2024, has appealed to the United States to take delivery of some of the aircraft immediately, without delay. As a military action plan against Iran is likely to justify the need for an accelerated procurement of the tankers, the US has refused to accelerate the programme.


At the same time, peace agreements with Arab countries are probably too recent for the Arab monarchies to engage in a joint military operation with Israel. A military operation against Iran's nuclear programme cannot be ruled out completely, but it is hoped that the issues surrounding the programme will be resolved diplomatically.

## **2.7 The possible effects of Mohseh Farizadeh's assassination**

The attack on Iranian nuclear scientist Mohseh Farizadeh on 27 November 2020 shook the Middle East and exacerbated the tense situation between Iran, Israel and the US. According to an official statement by the Iranian defence ministry, the scientist was attacked by armed terrorists in the city of Damavand, near Tehran, while travelling in a convoy with his wife. Although the information is not entirely clear, it is likely that the incident involved a shoot-out between the unknown assailants and Farizadeh's bodyguards, in which he was wounded. Some sources have suggested that the attack may have been carried out with a remote-controlled weapon, which experts are sceptical about, but if true, it indicates that the attackers used highly sophisticated, advanced technology. The scientist was subsequently rushed to hospital, where doctors were unable to save his life and he died later that day as a result of the attack. (Fassihi et al, 2020)

The death of the renowned scientist is a huge loss for Iran, as he was one of the leading physicists in the country's nuclear programme as of 2018. However, this is not the first time

that unknown assailants have eliminated an Iranian nuclear scientist who was of great importance to the government. In January 2010, Masoud Alimohammadi, followed by Majid Shahriari in January 2010, Darioush Rezaeinejad in 2011 and Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan the following year, were the victims of attacks on physicists. (McCarthy, 2020)



8. Figure Killing of Iran's Nuclear scientists  
 Source: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/12/03/timeline-the-killing-of-irans-nuclear-scientists-infographic/?sh=753c8ced78b7> Downloaded: 2022.05.01.

It can be assumed that all the victims were involved in the nuclear weapons programme, and may even have played a leading role, but Iran has always strongly denied this claim. During Barack Obama's presidency, Iran and the US have held a series of talks, including a phone call between Iranian President Hasan Rouhani and Obama. One of the most important steps in the US president's foreign policy was the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. However, the presidency of Donald J. Trump brought a new twist to US-Iranian relations when he announced that the US was withdrawing from the nuclear deal, imposing trade and currency sanctions on the country. The US, and Israel, which supported it in this decision, argued that the deal only further strengthened Iran's power in the region and gave it the opportunity to increase its nuclear

arsenal. After the US withdrew from the deal and pressured Iran, Iran announced that it would no longer comply with the restrictions contained in the deal.

Although Mohseh Farizadeh was the chief physicist of Iran's nuclear programme, his death may not be of such significance that it will set back Iran's development of its nuclear programme in the long term. After all, the nuclear programme is so advanced that its success no longer depends on one person, so we can assume that there are political interests behind the attack. There could have been several reasons for the attack: one was to slow down the implementation of the nuclear programme, as mentioned above, and to make Iran's task more difficult. However, other interests may also be at work, such as forcing Iran to retaliate, or even sabotaging the future relationship and possible rapprochement between the new US President, Joe Biden, and Iran. (Fassihi et al, 2020)

With regard to the Iranian nuclear scientist attacks, there is no clear answer as to who the perpetrators might have been or which country or countries might have been behind them. Iran's deteriorating relations with Israel and the US make them the prime suspects for the state leadership. Following the death of Mohseh Farizadeh, the Iranian government immediately blamed Israel for the attack, as it had done in previous years. A few days after Farizadeh's death, the Iranian government detained several people accused of involvement in the attack. In addition, Iran claimed to have found conclusive evidence that Israel was behind the attacks, but it has not made this public so far (and probably never will). Iranian diplomat Hossein Amir Abdollahian added that the administration suspects that Israel would not have been able to carry out the operation alone and that the US may also have played a major role in organising and carrying out the attack. The Israeli government has remained silent on the record, neither acknowledging nor denying the events. (nytimes.com, n.a)

An important detail is that Israel has also alleged that Farizadeh played a leading role in the design and implementation of Iran's covert nuclear weapons programme, which led to his blacklisting in the country. For this reason, the scientist could have been an important target for Israeli intelligence. The allegation that the physicist was involved in a covert nuclear programme is vehemently denied by the Iranian government, which claims that their nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only and that the covert programme does not exist. However, the fact that the renowned physicist was constantly accompanied by bodyguards confirms Israel's suspicion that he played a key role in the nuclear programme. If the information is true that the scientist was wounded by a remote-controlled weapon, Israel or the US would be able to design and build this advanced weapon and carry out a complex operation

to successfully carry out the assassination. However, until this is proven, we cannot know for sure that only a power with advanced technology carried out the attack on Farizadeh. Given Israel's ongoing consultation with the US on previous covert operations, it is reasonable to assume that, if Israeli intelligence was behind the assassination, the US administration was aware of the plan well before it was carried out. (nytimes.com, n.a.)

Following the assassination, Iran declared that it would take revenge against the perpetrators, which would most likely be a threat to Israel's security. For the time being, the US position in the Middle East does not seem to be threatened by Iran's statement, as it has named only Israel as the perpetrator. However, an escalating conflict between the two powers could have a very negative impact on Joe Biden's presidency, and if Iran decides that the US is also threatening the success of its nuclear programme, the relationship between the two could easily deteriorate. If President Biden were to decide to lift trade and currency sanctions against Iran, as Iran would like, a conflict between the two countries would greatly complicate the situation. Biden appears to be inclined to compromise, that if Iran again abides by the 2015 nuclear deal, the US will also back down and negotiations between them can resume. However, until cooperation between them begins, we can expect Iran to make further improvements to its nuclear programme and to increasingly seek to counteract the sanctions imposed on it. In early December, the Iranian parliament passed a proposal that the government, in violation of the nuclear agreement, should extract and store at least 120 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium through the National Atomic Energy Agency. It is not yet certain that the resolution will become law, but the general mood following the assassination makes it highly likely. (bbc.com, 2021)

## CONCLUSION

The development of a sanctions system against Iran has had several turning points in history. The sanctions regime, which has been built up over some 40 years, has significantly impacted Iran's economy, industries, trade, and relations with international actors. The lifting of the arms embargo on October 18, 2020 can be seen as a historical event that could significantly impact the future role of Iran, both internationally and in the context of its neighbors and regional level. Given the rapid pace of change in events, it is difficult to predict precisely what the next significant event could be for Iran's future, but knowing the sanctions imposed and the circumstances surrounding their lifting, speculation about the future can be reflected in a specific direction. However, it can certainly be said that the lifting of sanctions will have an uplifting economic effect compared to previous times and could provide a positive impetus and a perfect basis for improving the situation in sectors and industries such as banking, transport, energy, business and trade. The recent lifting of sanctions and the ability to summarize and understand their history provides an excellent opportunity to understand Iran's past and present better and build a picture of its possible future.

Iran's nuclear program began in 1957, initiating a civilian nuclear program under the US Atoms for Peace program. The Iranian Revolution and the capture of the US embassy in Tehran have severed US-Iranian ties and harmed Iran's relations with the West. Iranian nuclear initiatives have been put on hold. Iran joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and in 1974, it signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Iran was added to the US State Department's list of sponsoring terrorism in 1980, thus placing extensive sanctions on Tehran. In the 1990s, Iran introduced economic development plans to boost the energy sector alongside oil exports. In the framework of international cooperation, Iran has begun building its new nuclear reactors with substantial Russian assistance. 1990 The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 was passed by Congress, prohibiting the transfer of regulated products or technologies that may make a donation to Iran's proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, often known as the Iran Sanctions Act, punishes foreign and US investment in Iran's energy industry that exceeded \$20 million in a year.

In the early 2000s, preparation of a site to accommodate a uranium centrifuge line began in Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, and a heavy water plant and reprocessing plant were under construction in the town of Arak. 2003 The Board of Governors of the IAEA approved a resolution asking Iran to cease all enrichment and reprocessing procedures. Iran agreed to the call. However, the problems started in this period and escalated to the imposition of sanctions

because, despite Iran's signature of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement, it failed to fulfill its obligations and concealed much of its nuclear program. Iran retaliated by refusing to halt enrichment-related operations, as it had promised. As a result, Iran was investigated and found to have contradictory statements to the IAEA. It was also revealed that plutonium separation from used nuclear fuel rods was conducted on a laboratory scale. In addition, uranium enrichment was also conducted, and these processes were concealed for 22 years.

The IAEA passed a resolution declaring Iran violated its safeguards agreement in 2005. The Resolution stated that the nature of Iran's nuclear activities and the lack of confidence that they are peaceful fall under the UN Security Council's jurisdiction, setting the path for a future referral. Iran was required to disclose fresh information on this activity and explain its purpose since several of its nuclear tests were done in breach of its inspection accord with the IAEA. Starting in June 2003, Iran's justifications and the results of the IAEA's inspections were released in a series of Agency publications. In August 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors called for the process to be halted and, in the following year, demanded that Iran cease all reprocessing and enrichment-related activities. The P5+1 proposed a framework deal to Iran in 2006, providing Iran incentives to freeze its enrichment program indefinitely.

In the same year, The UN SC adopted Resolution 1696, making the IAEA's demands for Iran to stop enrichment and reprocessing activities legally binding. As a response to this proposal, Iran rejected the requirement of suspending enrichment. Resolution 1737 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council, imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to cease enrichment-related activities. The restrictions prevented nations from providing critical nuclear and missile technologies to Iran. They also required all countries to freeze the assets of ten Iranian companies and twelve persons linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Another resolution (namely Resolution 1747) was passed in opposition to Iran's continuous refusal to comply with the council's demand that it has to stop enriching uranium. The United Nations SC adopted Resolution 1803, which expanded Iran's sanctions. However, it emphasized an initial "freeze-for-freeze" procedure in which Iran would suspend any further enrichment activity in exchange for the UN SC agreeing not to impose further sanctions. In 2010 Resolution 1929 drastically increased the number of sanctions imposed on Iran. The Resolution put an arms embargo on the transfer of significant military systems to Iran, strengthened proliferation-related penalties, and prohibited Iran from conducting nuclear-capable ballistic missile testing.

Under pressure from several sanctions in the early 2010s, Iran found a common alternative in 2015 after years of working and negotiating through a series of meetings. As Iran has shown an improving trend of cooperation and has been reported by the IAEA to have honored the commitments made during the meetings in 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed on a JCPOA on July 14, 2015. The full implementation of the JCPOA ensured that Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful and would eliminate Iran's apparent ambitions to develop a nuclear arsenal and ensured the lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions on the nuclear program which Iran was conducting, and also the general abolition of multilateral and national prohibitions on Iran.

Therefore, the cooperative activities have started, and the parties have begun to implement the agreement. A biannual report on the implementation of Resolution 2231 was issued by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in 2017. Although the nuclear deal was respected and fulfilled, the study stated that Iran had breached Resolution 2231's weapons embargo restrictions. Furthermore, in the report, it was stated that the secretariat was also investigating accusations that ballistic missiles fired at Saudi Arabia from Yemen were provided by Iran to the Houthis in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Iran has refuted the allegations. In May 2018, President Donald Trump announced in Washington the US withdrawal from the 2015 Multi-Power Treaty on Iran's nuclear program. Between 2018 and 2020, the US tried to impose further sanctions, but the international community judged that Iran was still keeping its commitments.

In line with UN Resolution 2231, the UN sanctions on Iran's arms sales expired on October 18, 2020. I think it was a day of success for Iran in ending years of a wide-ranging and far-reaching sanctions regime that has had an enormous impact. It was, therefore, the turning point that led Iran's economy, its international relations, and its place in the international community in a new direction. In my opinion, only time will tell how Iran will shape its destiny in the coming years and whether it will learn from the reasons why it suffered the sanctions imposed or whether it will repeat the mistakes that led it to suffer them.



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## Nyilatkozat a szakdolgozat státuszáról (nyilvános, bizalmas)

Alulírott Nagy Bence Patrik (Neptun kód C13SUT ) a United Nations' Arms Embargo on Iran

című szakdolgozatommal/záródolgozatommal (továbbiakban mű) kapcsolatban az alábbiakról nyilatkozom:

- Kijelentem, hogy a mű BGE Dolgozattár repozitóriumába való feltöltésével más jogát nem sértem. Tudomással bírok arról, hogy az Egyetem a szerzői jogok meglétét nem ellenőrzi.
- Nyilatkozom, hogy a mű *(a megfelelő rész aláhúzendő)*
  - a bizalmas
  - a nyilvánosság számára hozzáférhető.
- Tudomásul veszem, hogy
  - szerzői jogsértés esetén az Egyetem az érintett dokumentum elérhetőségét a szerzői jogsértés tisztázása idejére átmenetileg korlátozza,
  - szerzői jogsértés esetén az érintett művet a Repozitórium adminisztrátora a Repozitóriumból haladéktalanul eltávolítja,
  - amennyiben a dolgozatomat a nyilvánosság számára hozzáférhetővé teszem, az egyetem a dolgozatot az interneten a nyilvánosság számára hozzáférhetővé teszi. Hozzájárulásom – szerzői jogaim maradéktalan tiszteletben tartása mellett – nem kizárólagos és időtartamra nem korlátozott felhasználási engedély.

Kelt: Budapest 2022. április 30.

Nagy Bence Patrik

hallgató

## NYILATKOZAT

Alulírott NAGY BENCE PATRIK büntetőjogi felelősségem tudatában nyilatkozom, hogy a szakdolgozatomban foglalt tények és adatok a valóságnak megfelelnek, és az abban leírtak a saját, önálló munkám eredményei.

A szakdolgozatban felhasznált adatokat a szerzői jogvédelem figyelembevételével alkalmaztam.

Ezen szakdolgozat semmilyen része nem került felhasználásra korábban oktatási intézmény más képzésén diplomaszerzés során.

Tudomásul veszem, hogy a szakdolgozatomat az intézmény plágiumellenőrzésnek veti alá.

Budapest, 2022. év 05 hónap 03 nap

Nagy Bence Patrik

hallgató aláírása